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ABSTRACT Geopolitical changes following the end of the Cold War
induced a worldwide decline in real long-term interest rates that, in turn, pro-
duced home price bubbles across more than a dozen countries. However, it
was the heavy securitization of the U.S. subprime mortgage market from 2003
to 2006 that spawned the toxic assets that triggered the disruptive collapse of
the global bubble in 2007–08. Private counterparty risk management and ofﬁ-
cial regulation failed to set levels of capital and liquidity that would have
thwarted ﬁnancial contagion and assuaged the impact of the crisis. This woe-
ful record has energized regulatory reform but also suggests that regulations
that require a forecast are likely to fail. Instead, the primary imperative has to
be increased regulatory capital, liquidity, and collateral requirements for banks
and shadow banks alike. Policies that presume that some institutions are “too
big to fail” cannot be allowed to stand. Finally, a range of evidence suggests
that monetary policy was not the source of the bubble.
I. Preamble
The bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 precipitated what,
in retrospect, is likely to be judged the most virulent global ﬁnancial crisis
ever. To be sure, the contraction in economic activity that followed in its
wake has fallen far short of the depression of the 1930s. But a precedent
for the virtual withdrawal, on so global a scale, of private short-term credit,
the leading edge of ﬁnancial crisis, is not readily evident in our ﬁnancial
history. The collapse of private counterparty credit surveillance, ﬁne-tuned
over so many decades, along with the failure of the global regulatory sys-
tem, calls for the thorough review by governments and private risk man-
agers now under way.
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crisis, ﬁnancial intermediation tried to function on too thin a layer of capital,
owing to a misreading of the degree of risk embedded in ever-more-complex
ﬁnancial products and markets. Section II of the paper reviews the causes
of the crisis. In section III the nature of ﬁnancial intermediation is probed. In
section IV a set of reforms is proposed that, I trust, address the shortcomings
of the existing regulatory structure. In section V the role of monetary policy
in the crisis is examined. I offer some conclusions in section VI.
II. Causes of the Crisis
II.A. The Arbitraged Global Bond Market and the Housing Crisis
The global proliferation of securitized, toxic U.S. subprime mortgages
was the immediate trigger of the crisis. But the origins of the crisis reach
back, as best I can judge, to the aftermath of the Cold War.
1 The fall of the
Berlin Wall exposed the economic ruin produced by the Soviet bloc’s eco-
nomic system. In response, competitive markets quietly, but rapidly, dis-
placed much of the discredited central planning so prevalent in the Soviet
bloc and the then Third World.
A large segment of the erstwhile Third World nations, especially China,
replicated the successful export-oriented economic model of the so-called
Asian Tigers (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan): fairly
well educated, low-cost workforces, joined with developed-world technol-
ogy and protected by increasingly widespread adherence to the rule of law,
unleashed explosive economic growth.
2 The International Monetary Fund
(IMF) estimated that in 2005 more than 800 million members of the
world’s labor force were engaged in export-oriented and therefore compet-
itive markets, an increase of 500 million since the fall of the Berlin Wall.
3
Additional hundreds of millions became subject to domestic competitive
forces, especially in the former Soviet Union. As a consequence, between
2000 and 2007 the real GDP growth rate of the developing world was
almost double that of the developed world.
Consumption in the developing world, however, restrained by culture
and inadequate consumer ﬁnance, could not keep up with the surge of
income, and consequently the saving rate of the developing world soared
from 24 percent of nominal GDP in 1999 to 34 percent by 2007, far out-
202 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
1. For a more detailed explanation see Greenspan (2007, chapter 20).
2. Foreign direct investment in China, for example, rose gradually from 1980 to 1990,
but then rose 39-fold by 2007.
3. IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2007, chapter 5, p. 162.
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to take up the slack, the result was a pronounced fall from 2000 to 2005 in
global long-term interest rates, both nominal (ﬁgure 1) and real.
Although the decline in global interest rates indicated, of necessity, that
global saving intentions were chronically exceeding global intentions to
invest, ex post global saving and investment rates in 2007, overall, were
only modestly higher than in 1999, suggesting that the uptrend in the
saving intentions of developing economies tempered declining investment
intentions in the developed world.
4 Of course, whether it was a glut of
intended saving or a shortfall of investment intentions, the conclusion is
the same: real long-term interest rates had to fall.
Inﬂation and long-term interest rates in all developed economies and the
major developing economies had by 2006 converged to single digits, I
believe for the ﬁrst time ever. The path of the convergence is evident in the
unweighted average variance of interest rates on 10-year sovereign debt of
15 countries: that average declined markedly from 2000 to 2005 (ﬁgure 2).
5
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Source: Various country sources.
a. The countries are Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
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Figure 1. Nominal Yields on 10-Year Government Debt, Average for 15 Countries,
1999–2010
a
4. That weakened global investment was a major determinant in the decline of global
real long-term interest rates was also the conclusion of a March 2007 Bank of Canada study
(Desroches and Francis 2007).
5. The variance of the logarithms of the 15 long-term interest rates exhibits similar trends.
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by the fall in global long-term real interest rates. Asset prices, particularly
home prices, accordingly moved dramatically higher.
The Economist’s surveys document the remarkable convergence of
nearly 20 individual nations’ home price rises during the past decade.
6
Japan, Germany, and Switzerland (for differing reasons) were the only
important exceptions. U.S. home price gains, at their peak, were no more
than the global peak average.
7 In short, geopolitical events ultimately led
to a fall in long-term mortgage interest rates that in turn led, with a lag, to
the boom in home prices globally.
II.B. Securitization of Subprimes: The Crisis Story Unfolds
The subprime mortgage market that developed in the 1990s was a small
but generally successful market of largely ﬁxed-rate mortgages. It serviced
mainly those potential homeowners who could not meet the down payment
requirement of a prime loan, but still had income adequate to handle a
ﬁxed-rate mortgage.
8 Only a modest amount had been securitized, but with
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Source: Various country sources.
a. Unweighted average for the 15 countries in figure 1.
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Figure 2. Variance of Interest Rates: 10-Year Government Debt in 15 Countries,
1999–2010
a
6. For example, The Economist, “Finance and Economics: Houses Built on Sand,” Sep-
tember 15, 2007, p. 104.
7. IMF, World Economic Outlook, April 2008, chapter 3, p. 113.
8. As recently as 2002, subprime mortgages accounted for 7 percent of total originations.
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prime lending was seen as increasingly proﬁtable to investors.
Belatedly drawn to this market, ﬁnancial ﬁrms, starting in late 2003,
began to accelerate the pooling and packaging of subprime mortgages into
securities (ﬁgure 4). The ﬁrms clearly had found receptive buyers. Heavy
demand from Europe,9 in the form of subprime mortgage-backed collater-
alized debt obligations, was fostered by attractive yields and a foreclosure
rate on the underlying mortgages that had been in decline for 2 years.
An even heavier demand was driven by the need of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac, the major U.S. government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs),
pressed by the Department of Housing and Urban Development and
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Figure 3. Monthly Changes in Home Prices, 1976–2010a
Source: Author’s calculations based on data from LoanPerformance and Standard & Poor’s.
a. Both series are seasonally adjusted.
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9. That many of the investors were European was conﬁrmed by the recent heavy losses
on U.S. mortgages reported by European investors. Euro-area banks, for example, exhibit a
very high ratio of residential mortgage-backed securities write-downs to the residential
mortgage loans they hold (IMF, Global Financial Stability Report, October 2009, p. 10).
The size of the buildup of subprime securities holdings abroad during the bubble years is
unclear. The U.S. Treasury’s annual Foreign Holdings Survey reports that by mid-2006, for-
eign investors held $341 billion of privately issued U.S. mortgage-backed securities, some
of which were commercial mortgage-backed securities. The less detailed mid-2002 survey
reported a total for all asset-backed securities of $169 billion, compared with $594 billion in
mid-2006.
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10 Given the size of
the GSEs’ expanded commitments to fund low- and moderate-income
housing, they had few alternatives but to invest, wholesale, in subprime
securities. The GSEs accounted for an estimated 42 and 49 percent of all
newly purchased subprime mortgage securities (almost all at adjustable
interest rates) retained on investors’ balance sheets during 2003 and 2004,
respectively (table 1).
11 That was more than ﬁve times their estimated share
in 2002.
Increasingly, the extraordinary demand pressed against the limited sup-
ply of qualiﬁed potential subprime borrowers. To reach beyond this limited
population, securitizers unwisely prodded subprime mortgage originators to
offer adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs) with initially lower monthly pay-
206 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
Figure 4. Issuance of Subprime Mortgage-Backed Securities, 1995–2010a
Source: Inside Mortgage Finance.
a. Quarterly data, seasonally adjusted.
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10. In October 2000 HUD ﬁnalized a rule “signiﬁcantly increasing the GSEs’ affordable
housing goals” for each year from 2001 to 2003. In November 2004 the annual housing
goals for 2005 and beyond were raised still further (Ofﬁce of Policy Development and
Research 2001).
11. Federal Housing Finance Agency, 2008 Annual Report to Congress (revised), His-
torical Data Tables 5b, Part 2, and 14b, Part 2 (originally published May 18, 2009, and
updated to include a signiﬁcant reclassiﬁcation effective September 3, 2009). Before the
revision, I estimated the share at less than 30 percent. Data newly reclassiﬁed by Fannie Mae
account for almost all the revision.
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12178-04a_Greenspan-rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:14 PM  Page 207ments. As loan underwriting standards deteriorated rapidly, ARMs soared
to nearly 62 percent of ﬁrst-mortgage subprime originations by the second
quarter of 2007.
12 By 2005 and 2006,
13 subprime mortgage originations had
swelled to a bubbly 20 percent of all U.S. home mortgage originations,
almost triple their share in 2002.
By the ﬁrst quarter of 2007, virtually all subprime mortgage origina-
tions were being securitized, compared with less than half in 2000,
14 and
subprime mortgage securities outstanding totaled more than $800 billion,
almost seven times their level at the end of 2001. The securitizers, prof-
itably packaging this new source of paper into mortgage pools and armed
with what turned out, in retrospect, to be grossly inﬂated credit ratings,
were able to sell seemingly unlimited amounts of these securities into what
appeared to be a vast and receptive global market.
II.C. A Classic Euphoric Bubble Takes Hold
As a measure of how far the appetite for risk taking beyond the securi-
tized mortgage market had gone, long-sacrosanct debt covenants were
eased as a classic euphoric global bubble took hold.
15 By 2007, yield
spreads in debt markets overall had narrowed to a point where there was
little room for further underpricing of risk. Our broadest measure of credit
risk, the yield spread of bonds rated CCC or lower and 10-year Treasury
notes, fell to a probable record low in the spring of 2007, although only
marginally so (ﬁgure 5). Almost all market participants of my acquain-
tance were aware of the growing risks, but also cognizant that risk had
often remained underpriced for years. I had raised the specter of “irrational
exuberance” over a decade before (Greenspan 1996), only to watch the
dot-com boom, after a one-day stumble, continue to inﬂate for 4 more
years, unrestrained by a cumulative increase of 350 basis points in the fed-
eral funds rate from 1994 to 2000. Similarly in 2002, I expressed my con-
cerns before the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) that “. . . our
208 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
12. Data are from the Mortgage Bankers Association (Haver Analytics).
13. We at the Federal Reserve were aware earlier in the decade of incidents of some
highly irregular subprime mortgage underwriting practices. But regrettably, we viewed it as
a localized problem subject to standard prudential oversight, not the precursor of the securi-
tized subprime mortgage bubble that was to arise several years later.
14. Inside Mortgage Finance Publications, The 2009 Mortgage Market  Statistical
Annual, vol. I, p. 4, and vol. II, p. 13.
15. These covenants are restrictions put on a borrower by a lender that might, for exam-
ple, restrict other borrowings, the level of working capital, or debt service cover.
12178-04a_Greenspan-rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:14 PM  Page 208extraordinary housing boom . . . ﬁnanced by very large increases in mort-
gage debt, cannot continue indeﬁnitely.” It lasted until 2006.
16
Clearly, with such experiences in mind, ﬁnancial ﬁrms were fearful that
should they retrench too soon, they would almost surely lose market share,
perhaps irretrievably. Their fears were given expression in Citigroup chair-
man and CEO Charles Prince’s now-famous remark in 2007, just before
the onset of the crisis: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things
will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve got to get
up and dance. We’re still dancing.”
17
The ﬁnancial ﬁrms accepted the risk that they would be unable to antic-
ipate the onset of crisis in time to retrench. They believed, however, that
the seemingly insatiable demand for their array of exotic ﬁnancial products
would enable them to sell large parts of their portfolios without loss. They
ALAN GREENSPAN 209
Source: Bank of America Merrill Lynch, Federal Reserve.
a. Average yield on Bank of America Merrill Lynch high-yield cash pay bonds rated CCC and lower minus 
yield on 10-year Treasury notes at constant maturity.
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Figure 5. Yield Spread of Bonds Rated CCC and Lower over 10-Year Treasury Notes,
1988–2010
a
16. The failure to anticipate the length and depth of the emerging bubble should not
have come as a surprise. Although we like to pretend otherwise, policymakers, and indeed
forecasters in general, are doing exceptionally well if we can get market projections essen-
tially right 70 percent of the time. But that means we get them wrong 30 percent of the time.
In 18
1⁄2 years at the Federal Reserve, I certainly had my share of the latter.
17. Michiyo Nakamoto and David Wighton, “Citigroup Chief Stays Bullish on Buy-
Outs,” Financial Times, July 9, 2007.
12178-04a_Greenspan-rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:14 PM  Page 209were mistaken. They failed to recognize that the conversion of balance
sheet liquidity to effective demand is largely a function of the degree of
risk aversion.
18 That process manifests itself in periods of euphoria (risk
aversion falling below its long-term, trendless average) and fear (risk aver-
sion rising above its average). A lessening in the intensity of risk aversion
creates increasingly narrow bid-asked spreads, in volume—the conven-
tional deﬁnition of market, as distinct from balance sheet, liquidity.
In this context I deﬁne a bubble as a protracted period of falling risk
aversion that translates into capitalization rates falling measurably below
their long-term, trendless averages.
19 Falling capitalization rates in turn
propel one or more asset prices to unsustainable levels. All bubbles burst
when risk aversion reaches its irreducible minimum, that is, when credit
spreads approach zero, although success at timing the onset of the deﬂation
has proved elusive.
Some bubbles burst without severe economic consequences—the dot-
com boom and the rapid run-up of stock prices in the spring of 1987, for
example. Others burst with severe deﬂationary consequences. That class of
bubbles, as Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff (2009) demonstrate,
210 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
18. I am deﬁning risk aversion more broadly here than the standard economic deﬁnition,
which states it in terms of utility over different outcomes. Risk aversion, as I use the term,
encompasses all factors that govern individuals’ willingness to engage in risky actions. Most
notably, it encompasses not only their preferences toward risk, but also their perceptions 
of risk.
Risk aversion is the primary human trait that governs the pricing of income-earning
assets. When people become uncertain or fearful, they disengage from perceived risk.
When their uncertainty declines, they take on new commitments. Risk aversion, by deﬁni-
tion, ranges from zero to full.
The extremes of zero and full risk aversion, of course, are outside all human experience.
Zero risk aversion—that is, the absence of any aversion at all to engaging in risky actions—
implies that an individual does not care about, or cannot discriminate among, objective
states of risk to life and limb. Such individuals cannot (or do not choose to) recognize life-
threatening events.
To acquire food, shelter, and the other necessary contributors to life requires action, that
is, the taking of risks, either by an individual or by others on the individual’s behalf.
Eschewing all objective risk is not consistent with life. Thus full risk aversion, like zero
risk aversion, is a hypothetical state that is never observed in practice.
Day-by-day existence occurs well within these outer boundaries of risk aversion and
can be very approximately measured by credit risk spreads. Credit spreads that very
approximately track changing risk aversion exhibit little to no long-term trend. Prime rail-
road bonds of the immediate post–Civil War years reﬂect spreads over U.S. Treasuries that
are similar to the post–World War II experience.
19. Yields on long-term Treasuries, a proxy for riskless capitalization rates, are essen-
tially trendless. Real yields in recent years are not far from the nominal Treasury bond
yields of 1900, when long-term inﬂation expectations (under the gold standard) were effec-
tively zero.
12178-04a_Greenspan-rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:14 PM  Page 210appears to be a function of the degree of leverage in the ﬁnancial sector,
particularly when the maturity of debt is less than the maturity of the assets
it funds.
Had the share of ﬁnancial assets funded by equity been signiﬁcantly
higher in September 2008, it seems unlikely that the deﬂation of asset
prices would have fostered a default contagion much, if at all, beyond that
of the dot-com boom. It is instructive in this regard that since the start of
the crisis, no unafﬁliated hedge fund has defaulted on its debt, despite very
large losses that often forced fund liquidation.
II.D. Why Did the Boom Reach Such Heights?
Why did the 2007 bubble reach century-rare euphoria? The answer, I
believe, lies with the dot-com bubble, which burst with very little footprint
on global GDP and, in the United States, produced the mildest recession in
the post–World War II period. The previous U.S. recession, in 1990–91,
was the second most shallow. Coupled with the fact that the 1987 stock
market crash left no visible impact on GDP, this experience led the Federal
Reserve and many a sophisticated investor to believe that future contrac-
tions would also prove no worse than a typical postwar recession.
The need for large bank capital buffers appeared increasingly less press-
ing in this period of Great Moderation. As late as April 2007, the IMF
noted that “global economic risks [have] declined since . . . September
2006....   The overall U.S. economy is holding up well . . . [and] the signs
elsewhere are very encouraging” (emphasis in original).
20 The banking
regulations adopted internationally under the Basel Accords did induce a
modest increase in capital requirements leading up to the crisis. But the
debates in Basel over the pending global capital accord that emerged as
Basel II were largely over whether to keep bank capital requirements
unchanged or to reduce them. Leverage accordingly ballooned.
It is in such circumstances that we depend on our highly sophisticated
global system of ﬁnancial risk management to contain market breakdowns.
How could it have failed on so broad a scale? The paradigm that spawned
several Nobel Prize winners in economics—Harry Markowitz, Robert
Merton, and Myron Scholes (and Fischer Black, had he lived)—was so
thoroughly embraced by academia, central banks, and regulators that by
2006 it had become the core of the global regulatory standards embodied
in Basel II. Many quantitative investment ﬁrms whose number crunching
sought to expose proﬁtable market trading principles were successful so
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But crunching data that covered only the last 2 or 3 decades did not yield a
model that could anticipate a crisis.
Mathematical models that calibrate risk, however, are surely better
guides to risk management than the “rule of thumb” judgments of a half
century ago. To this day it is hard to ﬁnd fault with the conceptual frame-
work of our models, as far as they go. Black and Scholes’ elegant option
pricing proof is no less valid today than a decade ago. The risk manage-
ment paradigm nonetheless harbored a fatal ﬂaw.
In the growing state of high euphoria, risk managers, the Federal
Reserve, and other regulators failed to fully comprehend the underlying
size, length, and impact of the negative tail of the distribution of risk out-
comes that was about to be revealed as the post-Lehman crisis played out.
For decades, with little to no data, most analysts, in my experience, had
conjectured a far more limited tail risk. This assumption, arguably, was the
major source of the critical risk management system failures.
Only modestly less of a problem was the vast and, in some cases, virtu-
ally indecipherable complexity of the broad spectrum of ﬁnancial products
and markets that developed with the advent of sophisticated mathematical
techniques to evaluate risk.
21 In despair, investment managers subcon-
tracted an inordinately large part of their task to the “safe harbor” risk des-
ignations of the credit rating agencies. No further judgment was required
of investment ofﬁcers who believed they were effectively held harmless by
the judgments of these government-sanctioned rating organizations. But
despite their decades of experience, the analysts at the credit rating agen-
cies proved no more adept at anticipating the onset of crisis than the invest-
ment community at large.
Even with the breakdown of our sophisticated risk management models
and the failures of the credit rating agencies, the ﬁnancial system would
have held together had the third bulwark against crisis—our regulatory
system—functioned effectively. But under crisis pressure, it too failed.
Along with the vast majority of market participants, regulators failed to
anticipate the onset of crisis.
The heavily praised U.K. Financial Services Authority was unable to
anticipate, and thus to prevent, the bank run that threatened one of that
country’s largest commercial banks, Northern Rock. The venerated credit
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21. I often maintained that because of this complexity, policymakers had to rely on an
international “invisible hand” to bring equilibrium to such undecipherable markets. The high
level of market liquidity appeared, erroneously, to conﬁrm that the system was working.
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ing for many a highly toxic derivative product. The Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, representing regulatory authorities from the world’s
major ﬁnancial systems, promulgated a set of capital rules that failed to
foresee the need that arose at the height of the crisis for much larger capi-
tal and liquidity buffers. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation had
noted as recently as the summer of 2006 that “more than 99 percent of all
insured institutions met or exceeded the requirements of the highest regu-
latory capital standards.”
22 U.S. commercial and savings banks are exten-
sively regulated, and even though for years our 10 to 15 largest banking
institutions have had permanently assigned on-site examiners to oversee
daily operations, many of these banks still were able to take on toxic assets
that brought them to their knees.
III. Financial Intermediation
III.A. The Purpose of Finance
The ultimate goal of a ﬁnancial system and its regulation in a market
economy is to direct the nation’s saving, plus any saving borrowed from
abroad (the current account deﬁcit), toward investments in plant, equip-
ment, and human capital that offer the greatest increases in the nation’s
output per worker hour. Nonﬁnancial output per hour, on average, rises
when obsolescent facilities (with low output per hour) are replaced with
facilities that embody cutting-edge technologies (with high output per
hour). This process improves average standards of living for a nation as a
whole. In the United States, the evident success of ﬁnance in the decades
before the crisis in directing scarce savings into real productive capital
investments appears to explain the generous compensation that nonﬁnan-
cial market participants had been willing to pay to the domestic producers
of ﬁnancial services.
The share of U.S. gross domestic product accruing as income to ﬁnance
and insurance, according to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, rose fairly
steadily from 2.3 percent in 1947 to 7.9 percent in 2006 (ﬁgure 6). Many
other global ﬁnancial centers exhibit similar trends.
23 Only a small part of
the rise in the United States represented an increase in net foreign demand
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24 The decline in the share to 
7.4 percent in 2008 reﬂects write-offs of savings previously presumed to
be productively employed.
25
Given the historic breakdown of the last 2 years, did nonfinancial
market participants over the decades misread the efficiency of finance
and inappropriately compensate this small segment of our economy? The
prevalence of so many ﬁnancial product failures certainly suggests so, for
the decade leading up to the crisis. Nonetheless, it is difﬁcult to make the
same judgment in the face of the fairly persistent rise of ﬁnance’s share for
the previous half century. Moreover, ﬁnance’s share of growth in nominal
GDP has been largely trendless since 1990, averaging about 10 percent
(ﬁgure 6).
The proportion of nonfarm employment accounted for by ﬁnance and
insurance since 1947 has risen far less than the share of gross income
originating in that sector, implying a signiﬁcant upgrading of the skills
attracted to ﬁnance and their compensation. A recent study (Philippon and
Reshef 2009) ﬁnds a markedly above-average rise in the salaries of those
214 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
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Figure 6. Share of the Financial Sector in GDP, 1960–2008
24. The net foreign demand for U.S. ﬁnancial services has grown signiﬁcantly but has
been largely offset by net imports of insurance services.
25. The share of national income originating in a somewhat broadened measure of
ﬁnance was little changed in 2009 from 2008.
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drawn to ﬁnance in recent years. By 2007 a quarter of all graduates of the
venerable California Institute of Technology were entering ﬁnance.
26
What are we to make of these extraordinarily persistent and stable
uptrends? Are they wholly accidental? (After all, there is no evidence of
such a trend in the prewar years.) It is not that the value of assets to be
managed has been persistently rising relative to GDP.
27 The answer to this
question matters a great deal.
In the context of financial reform, the critical issue that must be
addressed is whether the growing share of ﬁnancial services was happen-
stance, or evidence that a growing share of ﬁnancial services was required
to intermediate an ever more complex division of labor. I raise the issue
because many recent policy recommendations would lower the share of
ﬁnancial services income in GDP. Would such policies affect the growth
of U.S. nonﬁnancial productivity and our standards of living? More impor-
tant, given the recent failures of risk management and regulation, would
increased ﬁnancial regulation at this time thwart or (through increased sta-
bility) enhance economic growth? We need a far deeper understanding of
the role of ﬁnancial intermediation in promoting growth to answer that
question. How ﬁnance evolves in the postcrisis years should bring clarity
to many of today’s uncertainties.
III.B. Risky Financial Intermediation
As I noted earlier, the shape of the distribution of the extreme negative
tail risk was unknown before the default of Lehman. Since tail risk, in prin-
ciple at least, is open-ended,
28 there will always be some risk that bank cap-
ital cannot cover, and hence some, perhaps even many, banks will fail. But
that need not become a systemic problem if equity capital and liquidity
requirements are raised substantially and a signiﬁcant part of an intermedi-
ary’s debt takes the form of mandated contingent capital bonds (see section
IV.F). Still, there will always be the possibility, however remote, of the
private ﬁnancial intermediary system faltering, requiring sovereign credit
to keep vital intermediation functioning.
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27. Household net worth can be taken as a proxy for the net worth of the economy to be
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unchanged between 1952 and 1996. Since then it has been volatile, with recent quarters
returning to the long-term average.
28. Tail risk would converge to zero only if risk aversion were to become absolute, an
impossibility if life is to be sustained (see note 18).
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in private ﬁnancial markets. Indeed, in the United States as recently as
1991, in contemplation of the unthinkable and at the urging of the Federal
Reserve Board of Governors, Section 13-3 of the Federal Reserve Act was
reconsidered and amended by Congress. The section as revised grants
virtually unlimited authority to the Board to lend in “unusual and exigent
circumstances.”
III.C. The Hundred-Year Flood
A decade ago, addressing that issue, I noted,
There is a . . . difficult problem of risk management that central bankers confront every
day, whether we explicitly acknowledge it or not: How much of the underlying risk in a
financial system should be shouldered [solely] by banks and other financial institu-
tions? . . . [Central banks] have all chosen implicitly, if not in a more overt fashion, to
set our capital and other reserve standards for banks to guard against outcomes that
exclude those once or twice in a century crises that threaten the stability of our domes-
tic and international financial systems.
I do not believe any central bank explicitly makes this calculation. But we have cho-
sen capital standards that by any stretch of the imagination cannot protect against all
potential adverse loss outcomes. There is implicit in this exercise the admission that, in
certain episodes, problems at commercial banks and other ﬁnancial institutions, when
their risk-management systems prove inadequate, will be handled by central banks. At the
same time, society on the whole should require that we set this bar very high. Hundred-
year ﬂoods come only once every hundred years. Financial institutions should expect to
look to the central bank only in extremely rare situations. (Greenspan 2000a)
At issue is whether the crisis that arrived a few years later is that 
“hundred-year ﬂood.” At best, once-in-a-century observations yield results
that are scarcely robust. But recent evidence suggests that what happened
in the wake of the Lehman collapse is likely the most severe global ﬁnan-
cial crisis ever. In the Great Depression, of course, the collapse in eco-
nomic output and the rise in unemployment and destitution far exceeded
the current and, in the view of most, prospective future state of the global
economy. And of course, the widespread bank failures markedly reduced
short-term credit availability. But short-term ﬁnancial markets continued
to function.
Financial crises are characterized by a progressive inability to ﬂoat ﬁrst
long-term debt and eventually short-term and overnight debt as well.
Long-term uncertainty and therefore risk are always greater than near-term
risk, and hence risk spreads almost always increase with the maturity of
the ﬁnancial instrument in question.
29 The depth of a ﬁnancial crisis is
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29. Yields on riskless longer maturities can fall below short-term riskless rates if tight
money persuades investors that future inﬂation will be less.
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term credit.
The evaporation of the global supply of short-term credits within hours
or days of the Lehman failure is, I believe, without historical precedent. A
run on money market mutual funds, heretofore perceived to be close to
riskless, was under way within hours of the announcement of Lehman’s
default.
30 Within days, the withdrawal of trade credit set off a spiral of
global economic contraction, and the Federal Reserve had to move quickly
to support the failing commercial paper market. Even the almost sacro-
sanct, fully collateralized repurchase agreement market encountered severe
and unprecedented difﬁculties.
One has to dig very deep into peacetime ﬁnancial history to uncover
similar episodes. The market for call money, the key short-term ﬁnancing
vehicle of a century ago, shut down at the peak of the 1907 panic, “when
no call money was offered at all for one day and the [bid] rate rose from 
1 to 125%” (Homer and Sylla 1991, p. 340). Even at the height of the 1929
stock market crisis, the call money market functioned, although annual
interest rates did soar to 20 percent. In lesser ﬁnancial crises, availability of
funds in the long-term market disappeared, but overnight and other short-
term markets continued to function.
The withdrawal of overnight money represents ﬁnancial stringency at
its maximum. Investors will be willing to lend overnight before they feel
sufﬁciently protected by adequate capital to reach out for more distant, and
hence riskier, maturities.
The evaporation in September 2008 of short-term credits was global
and all encompassing. But it was the same process we had previously
observed at a more micro level.
31
IV. Regulatory Reform
IV.A. Principles of Reform
Given this apparently unprecedented period of turmoil, by what stan-
dard should proposals for reform of ofﬁcial supervision and regulation be
judged? I know of no form of economic organization based on a division
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has succeeded in achieving both maximum sustainable economic growth
and permanent stability. Central planning certainly failed, and I strongly
doubt that stability is achievable in capitalist economies, given that always-
turbulent competitive markets are continuously being drawn toward, but
never quite achieving, equilibrium (and that it is precisely this process that
leads to economic growth).
People acting without forethought cannot be productive except by
chance. Identification of effective innovation is, of necessity, a rational
act. Hence, regulation, by inhibiting irrational behavior when it can be
identified, can be stabilizing, as recent history has demonstrated. But
there is an inevitable cost of regulation in terms of economic growth and
standards of living when it imposes restraints beyond containing unproduc-
tive behavior.
Regulation by its nature imposes restraints on competitive markets. The
elusive point of balance between growth and stability has always been a
point of contention, especially when it comes to ﬁnancial regulation.
Throughout the postwar years in the United States, with the exception
of a limited number of bank bailouts (Continental Illinois in 1984, for
example), private capital proved adequate to cover virtually all provi-
sions for lending losses. As a consequence, there was never a definitive
test of what then constituted conventional wisdom, namely, that an equity
capital–to–assets ratio of 6 to 10 percent on average, the range that pre-
vailed between 1946 and 2003, was adequate to support the U.S. banking
system.
Risk managers’ assumption of the size of the negative tail of the distri-
bution of credit and interest rate risk was, as I noted earlier, of necessity
conjectural, and for generations we never had to test those conjectures.
Most of the shape of the distribution of perceived risk was thoroughly doc-
umented in the precrisis years, as “moderate” ﬁnancial crises and eupho-
rias traced out their relevant parts of the curve. But since modern ﬁnancial
data compilation began, we had never had a “hundred-year flood” that
exposed the full intensity of negative tail risk.
Risk managers, of course, knew in earlier decades that an assumption
of normality in the distribution of risk was unrealistic, but as a first
approximation that greatly facilitated calculation, it prevailed. The
mathematics implied by fat tails was also well understood, but our num-
ber crunching capabilities fell far short of making the required calcu-
lations to guide actions, except at prohibitive cost. That is no longer 
the case.
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is exactly the type of market seizure that tail risk conjecture was supposed
to capture, and did not. Having experienced Lehman, risk managers will be
far more cautious in evaluating future risk—at least for a while.
Many investment ﬁrms are constructing probability distributions of out-
comes employing, as the negative tail, data based on the experience of the
last 2 years. Using Monte Carlo simulations or other techniques, they have
concluded, not unexpectedly, that a financial crisis as severe as the one
that followed the Lehman default would have been predicted to occur far
more often than indicated by models in which risk is distributed normally.
Such evidence suggests the onset of a “hundred-year flood” somewhat
more often than once in a century.
Indeed, the aftermath of the Lehman crisis traced out a startlingly larger
negative tail than almost anybody had earlier imagined. At least partly
responsible may have been the failure of risk managers to fully under-
stand the impact of the emergence of shadow banking, a development that
increased ﬁnancial innovation but, as a result, also increased the level of
risk. The added risk was not compensated by higher capital.
When risk premiums are low over a protracted period, as they were, for
example, from 1993 to 1998 and from 2003 to 2007, investors’ willingness
to bid for all types of ﬁnancial assets, especially the high-risk tranches of
collateralized debt obligations, creates an illusion of permanent market 
liquidity that in the latest episode turned out to be intoxicating. It led several
major investment banks to attempt to weather the ﬁnancial storm with only
a thin veneer of tangible capital.
The most pressing reform, in my judgment, in the aftermath of the crisis
is to ﬁx the level of regulatory risk-adjusted capital, liquidity, and collat-
eral standards required by counterparties. Private market participants are
now requiring economic capital and balance sheet liquidity well in excess
of the yet-to-be-amended Basel II requirements. The shadow banks that
survived the crisis are now having to meet significantly tighter market
standards, with respect to capital, liquidity, and collateral, than existed
before the crisis. These are major changes that need to be reﬂected in the
new set of regulatory requirements and standards currently undergoing
global review.
One major fallout of the crisis is a marked rise in the degree of moral
hazard (see note 41), which requires that all ﬁnancial intermediaries be
subject to maximum leverage ratios. These ratios, as with all risk-adjusted
capital adequacy measures, need to be based on more realistic risk adjust-
ment factors applied to their assets and on the proportion of their liabilities
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requirements, although based on decades of experience, were clearly too
lax: for example, they erroneously designated pools of self-amortizing
home mortgages as among the safest of private instruments. And a surpris-
ingly and unfortunately large proportion of investment portfolio decisions
were, by law, accorded “safe harbor” status if they adhered to the credit
risk judgments (or rather, misjudgments) of the credit rating agencies.
To ensure that ﬁnancial intermediaries have adequate cash to meet
ongoing commitments in the event of a shutdown in external funding,
international bank liquidity regulation should match the tightening already
evident in private risk management paradigms (Basel Committee on Bank-
ing Supervision 2009). Collateral has shown itself particularly subject to
rapid recapture. Bear Stearns had nearly $20 billion in pledgeable liquid
funds a week before it collapsed. Morgan Stanley lost more than a half tril-
lion dollars of pledgeable collateral during the height of the crisis. In the
United States, to lower the risk of a “run on the broker,” the amount of cus-
tomer assets (collateral) held by broker-dealers that cannot be commingled
with their own assets needs to be increased. That would decrease the
amount of funds that can “run.” However, such action must be measured
and coordinated with other global regulators to avoid regulatory arbitrage
(see French and others forthcoming).
Unafﬁliated hedge funds have weathered the crisis—as extreme a real-
life stress test as one can construct—without taxpayer assistance or, as I
noted earlier, default. Although hedge funds are only lightly regulated,
much of their leveraged funding comes from more heavily regulated
banks. Moreover, as Sebastian Mallaby (2010) writes, “Most hedge funds
make money by driving prices away from extremes and toward their ratio-
nal level.” In so doing, they supply much-needed liquidity to ﬁnancial
markets when other competitors have withdrawn. Regulations that inhibit
the ability of hedge funds to supply such services are counterproductive.
Capital, liquidity, and collateral, in my experience, address almost all of
the ﬁnancial regulatory structure shortcomings exposed by the onset of the
crisis. In retrospect, there has to be a level of capital that would have pre-
vented the failure of, for example, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. (If
not 10 percent, think 40 percent.) Moreover, generic capital has the regu-
latory advantage of not having to forecast which particular ﬁnancial prod-
ucts are about to turn toxic. Certainly investors did not foresee the future
of subprime securities or the myriad other broken products. Adequate
capital eliminates the need for an unachievable speciﬁcity in regulatory
ﬁne tuning.
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the United States has become much too complex. Policymakers failed to
recognize, during the debates that led to legislation resulting in a badly
needed opening up of ﬁnancial competition (the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
of 1999), that increased competition, especially through shadow banking,
also increased negative tail risk. And increased negative tail risk necessi-
tates higher capital requirements.
IV.B. Upward Revisions of Bank Economic Capital
How much capital is currently being required of ﬁnancial institutions by
their counterparties will strongly inﬂuence the upcoming revisions in reg-
ulatory capital requirements. It is too soon to have deﬁnitive answers. But
very rough approximations for U.S. commercial banks can be inferred
from the response of bank credit default swaps (CDSs), a measure of bank
insolvency risk, to postcrisis events.
32 Movements in the CDS market
should also give us some direct insight into when the banking system is
perceived to have overcome the market’s fear of widespread insolvency—
and beyond that, to when markets perceive that banks will feel sufﬁciently
secure to return to the free lending of the precrisis years.
Starting late in 2008 and accelerating into the ﬁrst quarter of 2009, the
U.S. Treasury, through its Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), added
$250 billion to bank equity, the equivalent of adding approximately 2 per-
centage points to the equity capital-to-assets ratio. Its impact was impor-
tant and immediate.
As the ﬁnancial crisis took hold and deepened, the unweighted average
price of 5-year CDSs of six major U.S. banks—Bank of America, JP
Morgan, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, Wells Fargo, and Morgan Stanley—
rose from 17 basis points in early 2007 (for 5-year contracts, the average
annual price of insurance was 0.17 percent of the notional amount of the
underlying swap instruments) to 170 basis points just before the Lehman
default on September 15, 2008. In response to the Lehman default, the 
5-year CDS average price rose to more than 400 basis points by October 8.
On the day the TARP was announced (October 14), the price fell to
approximately 200 basis points, or essentially by half (ﬁgure 7). That a 
2-percentage-point addition to the banks’ book equity capital-to-assets
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implies an overall additional 4-percentage-point rise (from 10 percent in
mid-2007 to 14 percent) in the equity capital cushion required by market
participants to fund the liabilities of banks. That, of course, assumes linear
extrapolation, an admittedly herculean assumption, and, of course, pre-
sumes that the probability of a TARP before the Lehman default was de
minimis. The abruptness of the market reaction to the TARP announce-
ment appears to conﬁrm such a presumption, however.
Current book equity–to–assets ratios are still far from 14 percent. The
average ratio for commercial banks (as reported by the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, FDIC) was 10.9 percent on March 31, 2010, com-
pared with 10.1 percent in mid-2007. But unacknowledged loan losses
were estimated by the IMF last October (they are now less) to be in the
hundreds of billions of dollars. Trends in relevant liquidity are less readily
measured but are assumed to parallel changes in capital.
That banks still have more equity capital to add is also indicated by the
fact that the 5-year CDS price of March 31, 2010 (and since) remains over
100 basis points, still signiﬁcantly elevated relative to the 17 basis points
that prevailed in early 2007, when 10 percent capital was apparently
222 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
Source: Author’s calculations; Bloomberg.
a. Unweighted average prices of CDSs issued by Bank of America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, JPMorgan, 
Wells Fargo, and Morgan Stanley.
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to lend freely.
There is little doubt that the TARP’s cash injection markedly reduced
the fear of bank default through early 2009. More difﬁcult to judge is the
impact on bank CDSs of the dramatic increase in bank equity at market
value relative to bank assets at market value. That ratio rose 4.5 percentage
points from the end of March 2009 to the end of December, from 7.4 per-
cent to 11.9 percent (ﬁgure 8). There can be little doubt that this has mate-
rially increased the solvency of banks, although apparently less effectively,
dollar for dollar, than the more permanent change in book-value equity.
33
Much of the repayment of TARP investments to the U.S. Treasury was
doubtless ﬁnanced by new equity issuance, made possible by a more than
one-half-trillion dollar increase in U.S. commercial bank equity at market
value, and by borrowings made much easier (and cheaper) by the increased
equity buffer engendered by gains in market-valued bank equity. The
parceling of relative contributions of the TARP and of capital gains to bank
solvency and willingness to lend may not be fully clear even in retrospect.
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Figure 8. Equity-to-Assets Ratios at FDIC-Insured Commercial Banks, 2004–09
33. Between the end of March and the end of December 2009, the average CDS price
fell from 369 to 104 basis points, while the ratio of the market value of equity to the market
value of assets rose 450 basis points.
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pants to infer that the U.S. Treasury would, at least for a while, stand
behind the liabilities of the banking system. This may explain the diver-
gence since mid-September 2009 between short-term (1- and 3-month)
LIBOR-OIS spreads (an alternative to CDS spreads as a short-term mea-
sure of the likelihood of bank default) and 5- and 10-year CDS spreads.
Short-term LIBOR-OIS spreads had returned to their precrisis level by the
end of September 2009. Long-maturity CDS prices are only partway back
(table 2). The 1-year LIBOR-OIS spread falls in between. Clearly, either
markets are discounting some of the bank capital cushion at market value 5
and 10 years hence, owing to the volatility of stock prices, and/or they
question the political willingness, or ability, of the U.S. government, after
markets return to normal, to initiate another bank bailout.
34
Given the foregoing set of fragile assumptions and conclusions (and
they are all we have), I would judge that regulatory equity capital require-
ments in the end will be seen to have risen from the 10 percent precrisis
level (in terms of book value) to 13 or 14 percent by 2012, and liquidity
and collateral requirements will toughen commensurately.
IV.C. What Regulation Can Do
What, in my experience, supervision and examination can do as a back-
up to capital requirements and counterparty surveillance is promulgate
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Table 2. CDS and LIBOR-OIS Spreads at Various Maturities, September 2009 and
March 2010
Basis points
MaturityS eptember 15, 2009 March 31, 2010
CDS
10 years 129 111
5 years 125 107
3 years 129 88
1 year 123 61
LIBOR-OIS
3 months 12 11
1 month 7 8
Sources: British Bankers’ Association, Bloomberg, Reuters, and Haver Analytics.
34. As fear of contagion from the European sovereign debt crisis mounted in the spring
of 2010, CDS and LIBOR-OIS spreads rose markedly.
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future. Supervision
—can audit and enforce capital and liquidity requirements
35
—can require that financial institutions issue some debt that will
become equity should equity capital become impaired (see section IV.F)
—can, and has, put limits or prohibitions on certain types of concen-
trated bank lending
—can prohibit complex afﬁliate and subsidiary structures whose sole
purpose is tax avoidance or regulatory arbitrage
—can inhibit the reconsolidation of afﬁliates previously sold to investors,
especially structured investment vehicles (SIVs)
36
—can require “living wills” in which ﬁnancial intermediaries indicate,
on an ongoing basis, how they can be liquidated expeditiously with mini-
mum impact on counterparties and markets.
IV.D. Some Lessons of Regulatory Capital History
In the late 19th century, U.S. banks required equity capital of 30 per-
cent of assets to attract the liabilities required to fund their assets. In the
pre–Civil War period, that ﬁgure topped 50 percent (ﬁgure 9). Given the
rudimentary nature of 19th-century payment systems and the poor geo-
graphical distribution of reserves in what was then an agricultural econ-
omy, competition for bank credit was largely local. It enabled national
banks on average to obtain returns (net income) on their assets of well
over 200 basis points in the late 1880s, and probably more than 300 basis
points in the 1870s (compared with 70 basis points a century later).
Increasing efﬁciency of ﬁnancial intermediation, owing to consolidation
of reserves and improvements in payment systems, exerted competitive
pressure on proﬁt spreads to narrow and allowed capital-to-assets ratios to
decline. In marked contrast, the annual average net income rate of return
on equity was amazingly stable, rarely falling outside a range of 5 to 10 per-
cent, measured annually, during the century from 1869 to 1966 (ﬁgure 10).
That meant that net income as a percentage of assets and the degree of
leverage were approximately inversely proportional during that century.
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35. Increased capital requirements can go a long way toward containing large compen-
sation packages. The recent higher proﬁts will be needed to fulﬁll the capital requirements,
especially if global competitors have similar capital requirements.
36. When, during the crisis, such assets appeared about to fail, sponsoring companies,
fearful of reputation risk (a new insight?), reabsorbed legally detached afﬁliates at subse-
quent great loss.
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Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
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Figure 10. Ratio of Net Income to Equity in the Banking Sector, 1869–2007
Source: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.
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Figure 9. Ratio of Equity Capital to Assets in the Banking Sector, 1834–2009
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resulted from rising Basel capital requirements) moved modestly higher
during 1966–82 owing to a rapid expansion in noninterest income, for
example from ﬁduciary activities, service charges and fees, and securitiza-
tions (and later from expansion into investment banking and brokerage).
Noninterest income rose signiﬁcantly between 1982 and 2006, increasing
net income to nearly 15 percent of equity, as a consequence of a marked
increase in the scope of bank powers. That increase in part reflected 
the emergence in April 1987 of court-sanctioned and Federal Reserve–
regulated “Section 20” investment banking afﬁliates of bank holding com-
panies.
37 The transfer of such business is clearly visible in the acceleration
of gross income originating in commercial banking relative to that in
investment banking starting in 2000 (Bureau of Economic Analysis).
38
I tentatively conclude that the historical relative stability of average net
income–to–equity ratios dating back to the post–Civil War years reﬂects
an underlying ex ante market-determined rate of return on intermediation.
In summary, the crisis will leave in its wake a significantly higher
capital-to-assets ratio requirement, both economic and regulatory, that
must be reached if intermediation is to be restored to the point where banks
and other ﬁnancial institutions are conﬁdent they have a sufﬁciently secure
capital cushion to lend freely.
IV.E. Limits to Regulatory Capital Requirements
If we accept as a benchmark the remarkable stability of the ratio of bank
net income to equity capital (ranging between 5 and 15 percent) that has
prevailed, with rare exceptions, since the end of the Civil War (ﬁgure 10),
we can infer the highest average ratio of capital to assets that a banking
system can tolerate before a signiﬁcant number of banks are required to
raise their margin, or shrink their size, or both. I assume a 5 percent annual
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37. This development meant that the repeal, under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, of the
1933 Glass-Steagall Act, which had separated commercial and investment banking, changed
very little. From the enactment of Gramm-Leach-Bliley in 1999 to the Federal Reserve’s
acceptance of Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley as ﬁnancial services holding companies
at the height of the crisis, no applications to employ the greater powers were forthcoming.
That forbearance apparently reﬂected a desire to stay clear of the Federal Reserve’s regula-
tory embrace.
38. Rates of return crashed during the ﬁrst half of 2009, with declines matched (on an
annual basis) only by those in the depression years 1932–34. Both cases reﬂected a rare
sharp breakout from the historical range, resulting mostly from large write-offs on previ-
ously extended loans.
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distribution of the thousands of banks that would make up the average.
Accordingly, for this exercise it is employed as the ex ante competitively
required average minimum return on intermediation. I assume as a ﬁrst
approximation that all variables are independent. If so, the highest ratio of
capital to assets that the U.S. banking system can tolerate and still supply
the nonﬁnancial sector with adequate ﬁnancial service capacity can be
inferred from the following identity:
where π is net income, C is equity capital, and A is total assets. If π/C =
0.05, then 
It can be shown that π/A = (rr − rp − k)w + n − e −α , where rr is the rate
of interest received from earning assets, rp is the interest rate paid on earn-
ing assets, k is the ratio of losses to earning assets, w is the ratio of earning
assets to total assets, n is the ratio of noninterest income to assets, e is the
ratio of noninterest expense to total assets, and α is the ratio of taxes and
minor other adjustments to total assets. As can be seen from table 3, virtu-
ally all of the rise in π/A and π/C for U.S. banks as a group since 1982 is
due to the marked rise in noninterest income.
In the years immediately before the onset of the crisis, π/A averaged
0.012, and therefore the inferred maximum average regulatory capital,
C/A, as a ﬁrst approximation, was 0.24. A rate higher than 0.24, all else
equal,
39 would put the average rate of return on equity below the critical 
5 percent level. If π/A were to revert back to its average for 1950–75
(0.0074), then C/A = 0.15, marginally above the 12 to 14 percent presumed
market-determined capital requirement that would induce banks to lend
freely.
These calculations, as I noted, assume a static model in which all vari-
ables are independent. But clearly the required rate of return on equity 
cannot be independent of the capital-to-assets ratio. Increased capital
C
AA
=× 20
π
.
ππ
CA
A
C
=× ,
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39. I do not deny that all else is not equal, and hence such conclusions are more illus-
trative than explanatory. A dynamic model is beyond the scope of this paper. Net interest
income has enough of a history to effectively model, but noninterest income arguably
does not.
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12178-04a_Greenspan-rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:14 PM  Page 229reduces the risk of the balance sheet and hence will attract equity investors
despite a lower rate of return. This implies that owing to the recent rise in
π/A, the actual regulatory capital ceiling can thus readily exceed the sta-
tic ceiling of C/A = 0.24. In any event, increased capital requirements
will surely reduce the marginal lending that occurred in recent decades
owing to the failure to fully fund tail risk. Much of that marginal lending
was in effect being subsidized by taxpayers. That subsidy became fully
funded in 2008 by sovereign credit. Removing the subsidy through higher
capital requirements will, of course, shrink financial intermediary bal-
ance sheets. Much of this lending was evidently nonproductive, and its
loss is not apt to be a problem for our complex economy’s required level
of intermediation.
IV.F. Too Big to Fail
Beyond significantly increased capital requirements is the necessity
of addressing the problem of some financial firms being “too big to fail”
or, more appropriately, “too interconnected to be liquidated quickly.”
The productive employment of the nation’s scarce saving is threatened
when financial firms at the edge of failure are supported with taxpayer
funds and designated as systemically important institutions. I agree with
Gary Stern, the former president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Min-
neapolis, who has long held that “creditors will continue to underprice
the risk-taking of these financial institutions, overfund them, and fail to
provide effective market discipline. Facing prices that are too low, sys-
temically important firms will take on too much risk” (Stern 2009, p. 56).
These firms absorb scarce savings that need to be invested in cutting-
edge technologies, if output per hour and standards of living are to con-
tinue to rise.
After wallowing in the backwaters of economics for years, “too big to
fail” has arisen as a major, visible threat to economic growth. It ﬁnally
became an urgent problem when Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were
placed into conservatorship on September 7, 2008. Before then, U.S. pol-
icymakers (with ﬁngers crossed) could point to the fact that Fannie and
Freddie, by statute, were not backed by the “full faith and credit of the
U.S. government.” Market participants however, did not believe the
denial, and they consistently afforded Fannie and Freddie a special credit
subsidy (Passmore, Sherlund, and Burgess 2005). On September 7, 2008,
market participants were ﬁnally vindicated.
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac need to be split up into smaller compa-
nies, none of them “too big to fail,” and then reconstructed into stand-
230 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
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requires that these GSEs be prohibited from accumulating large portfolios
of assets that add no useful backing to the process of securitization or
the mortgage markets more generally. Those portfolios’ sole purpose is
to profit from the subsidy that market participants grant to these GSEs
(Greenspan 2004b).
One highly disturbing consequence of the too-big-to-fail problem that
has emerged since the September 2008 federal takeover of Fannie Mae and
Freddie Mac is that market players will now believe that every signiﬁcant
ﬁnancial institution, should the occasion arise, is subject to being bailed
out with taxpayer funds. It is going to be very difﬁcult for legislators to
persuade future investors otherwise.
Businesses that are subject to being bailed out have competitive market
and cost-of-capital advantages, but not necessarily efﬁciency advantages,
over ﬁrms not thought to be systemically important. For years the Federal
Reserve was concerned about the ever-growing size of our largest ﬁnancial
institutions. Federal Reserve research had been unable to ﬁnd economies
of scale in banking beyond a modest size (Berger and Humphrey 1994, 
p. 7; see also Berger 1994). A decade ago, citing such evidence, I noted
that “megabanks being formed by growth and consolidation are increas-
ingly complex entities that create the potential for unusually large sys-
temic risks in the national and international economy should they fail”
(Greenspan 1999). Regrettably, we did little to address the problem.
How to deal with systemically threatening institutions is among the
major regulatory problems for which there are no good solutions. Early
resolution of bank problems under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpo-
ration Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) appeared to have worked
with smaller banks during periods of general prosperity. But the notion
that risks can be identified in a sufficiently timely manner to enable the
liquidation of a large failing bank with minimum loss proved untenable
during this crisis, and I suspect will prove untenable in future crises 
as well.
40
The solution that, in my judgment, has at least a reasonable chance of
reversing the extraordinarily large “moral hazard” that has arisen over the
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40. The FDIC has experienced large losses in the value of assets taken over in resolution
during the last 2 years.
12178-04a_Greenspan-rev2.qxd  8/11/10  12:14 PM  Page 231past year and more41 is to require banks and possibly all ﬁnancial inter-
mediaries to issue contingent capital bonds, that is, debt that is auto-
matically converted to equity when equity capital falls below a certain
threshold. Such debt will, of course, be more costly on issuance than sim-
ple debentures.
However, should contingent capital bonds prove insufﬁcient, we should
allow large institutions to fail and, if assessed by regulators as too inter-
connected to liquidate quickly, be taken into a special bankruptcy facility,
whereupon the regulator would be granted access to taxpayer funds for
“debtor-in-possession financing” of the failed institution. Its creditors
(when equity is wholly wiped out) would be subject to statutorily deﬁned
principles of discounts from par (“haircuts”), and the institution would
then be required to split up into separate units, none of which should be of
a size that is too big to fail. The whole process would be administered by a
panel of judges expert in ﬁnance.
I assume that some of the newly created ﬁrms would survive, and others
fail. If, after a ﬁxed short period of time, no viable exit from the bank-
232 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
41. Moral hazard, in an economic context, arises when an institution is not debited with
the full costs of its actions and therefore will tend, in part at least, to act contrary to how it
would act were it pressured solely by unfettered competition, where the externalities of
potential bailout costs are fully internalized by competitors. The institution accordingly
requires other parties to suffer some of the costs of its actions.
An interesting speculation is whether the crisis that emerged in August 2007 from the
extraordinary leverage (as much as 20 to 30 times tangible capital) taken on by U.S. invest-
ment banks would have occurred had these ﬁrms remained the partnerships that they were
up to a quarter century ago. The 1970 ruling that allowed broker-dealers to incorporate and
gain permanent capital seemed sensible at the time. Nonetheless, as partnerships, Lehman
Brothers and Bear Stearns almost surely would not have departed from their historically
low leverage. Before incorporation, fearful of the joint and several liability to which gen-
eral partnerships are subject, those entities shied away from virtually any risk they could
avoid. Their core underwriting of new issues rarely exposed them for more than a few days.
To be sure, the senior ofﬁcers of Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers lost hundreds of
millions of dollars from the collapse of their stocks. But none, to my knowledge, has ﬁled
for personal bankruptcy, and their remaining wealth allows them to maintain much of their
previous standard of living.
Replicating the incentive structure of partnerships should be a goal whenever feasible in
future reform. That goal will doubtless not be always met given that the corporate structure
is seen as required to raise capital on a scale perceived as necessary in today’s global mar-
ket. To eliminate moral hazard, it should not be necessary to follow Hugh McCulloch, our
ﬁrst Comptroller of the Currency in 1863, who went somewhat over the edge in proposing
that the National Bank Act “be so amended that the failure of a national bank be declared
prima facie fraudulent, and that the ofﬁcers and directors, under whose administration such
insolvency shall occur, be made personally liable for the debts of the bank, and be punished
criminally, unless it shall appear, upon investigation, that its affairs were honestly adminis-
tered.” Under such a regime, moral hazard surely would not exist. 
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expeditiously as feasible.
IV.G. Regulations Embodying a Forecast Fail with Regularity
The crisis has demonstrated that neither bank regulators nor anyone else
can consistently and accurately forecast whether, for example, subprime
mortgages will turn toxic, or to what degree, or whether a particular
tranche of a collateralized debt obligation will default, or even whether the
ﬁnancial system as a whole will seize up. A large fraction of such difﬁcult
forecasts will invariably be proved wrong. Regulators can readily identify
underpriced risk and the existence of bubbles, but most important, they
cannot, except by chance, effectively time the onset of crisis.
42 This should
not come as a surprise.
A ﬁnancial crisis is deﬁned as an abrupt and sharp decline in the price of
income-producing assets, usually induced by a dramatic spike in the dis-
count rate on expected income ﬂows as market participants swing from
euphoria to fear. Implicit in any sharp price change is that it is unantici-
pated by the mass of market participants, for were it otherwise, the price
imbalances would have been arbitraged away.
Indeed, for years leading up to August 2007, it was widely expected that
the precipitating event of the “next” crisis would be a sharp fall in the dol-
lar, as the U.S. current account deﬁcit, starting in 2002, had increased dra-
matically. The dollar accordingly came under heavy selling pressure. The
rise in the euro-dollar exchange rate from around 1.10 in the spring of
2003 to 1.30 at the end of 2004 appears to have gradually arbitraged away
the presumed dollar trigger of the “next” crisis. The U.S. current account
deﬁcit did not play a prominent direct role in the timing of the 2007 crisis,
although because of that, it may in the next.
In the years ahead, forecasters will readily identify risks that are under-
priced—or at least priced at less than their historical average. But in
instance after instance, as I noted earlier, risk has remained underpriced for
years. Forecasters as a group will almost certainly miss the onset of the
next ﬁnancial crisis, as they have so often in the past, and I presume any
newly designated “systemic regulator” will also.
Many analysts argue that forecasting is not required. A systemic regula-
tor, they hold, could effectively ﬁne-tune capital and liquidity require-
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42. There has been confusion on the issue, to which I may have been a party. With rare
exceptions it has proved impossible to identify the point at which a bubble will burst, but its
emergence and development are visible in credit spreads.
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requirements presumably could be effective in assuaging imbalances. But
cycles are not uniform. In real time, where we are in the cycle is a forecast,
and cycles vary. For example, the low of the unemployment rate at cyclical
peaks (as identiﬁed by the National Bureau of Economic Research) since
1948 has ranged between 2.6 and 7.2 percent. Would we have judged a
turn in the business cycle when, for example, the unemployment rate rose
to 5.8 percent in April 1995, up from 5.4 percent in March? In the event,
the unemployment rate soon reversed itself and continued to fall for 
5 more years.
It is best to ﬁx regulatory parameters and let monetary policy carry the
discretionary load. The Federal Reserve will tighten if it observes rising
euphoria that signals mounting inﬂationary pressures (as it did in February
1994 and June 2004) or if risk premiums fall inordinately.
Moreover, discretionary regulatory rules would raise uncertainties that
could undesirably curb investment. Thus, in the current environment of
complexity, I see no ready alternative to signiﬁcantly increasing—and 
ﬁxing—regulatory capital requirements and liquidity and beeﬁng up indi-
vidual banks’ counterparty risk surveillance.
The Federal Reserve has been concerned for years about the ability of
regulatory supervisors and examiners to foresee emerging problems that
have eluded internal bank auditing systems and independent auditors. I
remarked in 2000 before the American Bankers Association, “In recent
years rapidly changing technology has begun to render obsolete much of
the bank examination regime established in earlier decades. Bank regula-
tors are perforce being pressed to depend increasingly on greater and more
sophisticated private market discipline, the still most effective form of
regulation. Indeed, these developments reinforce the truth of a key lesson
from our banking history—that private counterparty supervision remains
the ﬁrst line of regulatory defense” (Greenspan 2000b). Regrettably, that
ﬁrst line of defense failed.
A century ago, examiners could appraise individual loans and judge
their soundness.
43 But in today’s global lending environment, how does a
U.S. bank examiner judge the credit quality of, say, a loan to a Russian
bank, and hence of the loan portfolio of that bank? That in turn would
234 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Spring 2010
43. In 1903, O. Henry (W. S. Porter), who had more than a passing relationship with
banking shenanigans, wrote in “A Call Loan” about a ﬁctional bank examiner from the
Ofﬁce of the Comptroller of the Currency who was obsessed with the collateral backing a
$10,000 loan. Such detailed scrutiny is exceptionally rare in today’s larger banks.
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ties’ counterparties, all to judge the soundness of a single ﬁnancial trans-
action. In short, a bank examiner cannot, and neither can a credit rating
agency. How deep into the myriad layers of examination is enough for
certiﬁcation?
The complexity of our ﬁnancial system in operation spawns, in any
given week, many alleged pending crises that, in the event, never happen,
and innumerable allegations of ﬁnancial misconduct. To examine each
such possibility at the level of detail necessary to reach meaningful conclu-
sions would require an examination force many multiples larger than those
now in place in any of our banking regulatory agencies. Arguably, at such
levels of examination, sound bank lending and its necessary risk taking
would be impeded.
The Federal Reserve and other regulators were, and are, therefore
required to guess which of the assertions of pending problems or allega-
tions of misconduct should be subject to full scrutiny by a regulatory work-
force with necessarily limited examination capacity. But this dilemma
means that in the aftermath of an actual crisis, we will ﬁnd highly compe-
tent examiners failing to have spotted a Bernie Madoff. Federal Reserve
supervision and evaluation is as good as it gets, even considering the fail-
ures of past years. Banks still have little choice but to rely upon counter-
party surveillance as their ﬁrst line of crisis defense.
44
V. The Role of Monetary Policy
V.A. Monetary Policy and Home Price Bubbles
The global home price bubble of the last decade was a consequence of
lower interest rates, but it was long-term interest rates that galvanized
home asset prices, not the overnight rates of central banks, as has become
the seeming conventional wisdom. In the United States, the bubble was
driven by the decline in interest rates on ﬁxed-rate long-term mortgage
loans,
45 relative to their mid-2000 peak, 6 months before the FOMC began
easing the federal funds rate in January 2001.
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44. Having served on JP Morgan’s board for a decade just before my joining the Federal
Reserve, I had an extended insight into the effectiveness of that company’s counterparty sur-
veillance of Citicorp, Bank of America, Wells Fargo, and others, relative to the regulatory
surveillance by Federal Reserve banks.
45. Their average maturity is more than 26 years (Federal Housing Finance Agency).
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tracked changes in U.S. home prices 11 months earlier (as measured by
the 20-city S&P/Case-Shiller home price index), with an adjusted R
2 on the
regression of 0.500 and a t-statistic of −6.93. Thus long-term mortgage
rates were a far better indicator of home prices than the federal funds rate:
a regression of home prices on the latter exhibits an adjusted R
2 of 0.205 and
a t-statistic of −3.62 with only an 8-month lead.
46 Regressing home prices on
both the ﬁxed-rate mortgage (with an 11-month lead) and the federal funds
rate (with an 8-month lead) yields a highly signiﬁcant t-statistic for the
mortgage rate of −5.20, but an insigniﬁcant t-statistic for the federal funds
rate of −0.51.
This should not come as a surprise. After all, the prices of long-lived
assets have always been determined by discounting the ﬂow of income (or
imputed services) using interest rates on assets of comparable maturity. No
one, to my knowledge, employs overnight interest rates—such as the fed-
eral funds rate—to determine the capitalization rate of real estate, whether
it be the cash ﬂows of an ofﬁce building or the imputed rent of a single-
family residence.
It is understandable why, before 2002, the federal funds rate would have
been perceived as a leading indicator of many statistics that in fact are 
driven by longer-term interest rates. The correlation between the federal
funds rate and the rate on ﬁxed-rate mortgage loans from 1983 to 2002, for
example, had been a tight 0.86.
47 Accordingly, during those years, regres-
sions with home prices as the dependent variable would have seemingly
worked equally well with either long-term rates or overnight rates as the
explanatory variable.
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46. Both regressions, however, especially that using the funds rate, exhibit signiﬁcant
serial correlation, suggesting that the t-statistics are likely too high.
47. As a consequence, the Federal Reserve assumed that the term premium (the differ-
ence between long- and short-term rates) was a relatively stable, independent variable. The
failure in 2004 and 2005 of the 325-basis-point rise in the funds rate to carry the yield on 
the 10-year Treasury note along with it (as historically it almost invariably had) was
deemed a “conundrum.” That episode has dramatically changed the long-held view that
U.S. long-term interest rates were signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced, if not largely determined, by
monetary policy.
The emergence of globally arbitraged long-term rates has largely delinked U.S. long-
term rates from Federal Reserve policy. It has accordingly changed the “conundrum” from
why the 10-year Treasury note yield unexpectedly failed to respond to changes in the funds
rate in 2004, to why the interest rate term structure was so stable through the latter part of
the 20th century. Any notion that the Federal Reserve had of that stability being a funda-
mental characteristic of U.S. ﬁnance was dashed with the emergence of globally arbitraged
long-term rates.
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rate in the early part of this century. The correlation between them fell to
an insignificant 0.10 during 2002–05, the period when the bubble was
most intense, and as a consequence, the funds rate exhibited little, if any,
influence on home prices.
The funds rate was lowered from 6
1⁄2 percent in early 2001 to 1
3⁄4 percent
in late 2001, and then eventually to 1 percent in mid-2003, a rate that held
for a year. The Federal Reserve viewed the lowering to 1 percent as an act
of insurance against the falling rate of inflation in 2003, which had char-
acteristics similar to the Japanese deﬂation of the 1990s. We thought the
probability of deﬂation small, but the consequences, should it occur, dan-
gerous. On the other hand, we recognized that a funds rate held too low for
too long might encourage product price inﬂation. I thought at the time that
the rate decrease nonetheless reﬂected an appropriate balancing of risks. I
still do.
To my knowledge, that lowering of the federal funds rate nearly a
decade ago was not considered a key factor in the housing bubble.
Indeed, as late as January 2006, Milton Friedman, historically the Federal
Reserve’s severest critic, evaluating monetary policy from 1987 to 2005,
wrote, “There is no other period of comparable length in which the Federal
Reserve System has performed so well. It is more than a difference of
degree; it approaches a difference of kind.”
48
It thus came as somewhat of a surprise when, in August 2007, Stanford
University’s John Taylor (with whom I rarely disagree) argued that Fed-
eral Reserve policy in the aftermath of the dot-com bubble was the prin-
cipal cause of the emergence of the U.S. housing bubble. According to
Taylor (2007), had the funds rate followed his eponymous rule, housing
starts would have been signiﬁcantly lower and the U.S. economy would
have avoided “much of the housing boom” and price bubble. His conclu-
sion, often copied and repeated, seems, I fear, to have become close to con-
ventional wisdom.
49
As evidence, Taylor notes ﬁrst the “signiﬁcant” inverse correlation,
with a lag, from mid-1959 to mid-2007 between the federal funds rate and
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48. Milton Friedman, “The Greenspan Story: ‘He Has Set a Standard,’ ” Wall Street
Journal, January 31, 2006.
49. For example, a recent survey by the Wall Street Journal (Jon Hilsenrath, “Bernanke
Challenged on Rates’ Role in Bust,” January 14, 2010) found that 78 percent of Wall Street
and business economists surveyed and 48 percent of academic economists surveyed thought,
“Excessively easy Fed policy in the ﬁrst half of the decade helped cause a bubble in house
prices.”
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mation to a central bank’s monetary policy stance), the Federal Reserve
had set an inappropriately low funds rate during 2002–05.
50 As a conse-
quence, he claims, “housing starts jumped to a 25-year high....   The surge
in housing demand led to a surge in housing price inﬂation. [The] jump in
housing price inﬂation then accelerated the demand for housing in an
upward spiral” (Taylor 2007).
Taylor postulates housing starts as the primary driver of home prices.
The evidence, however, suggests that it is not starts that drive prices and
initiate the “upward spiral,” but the other way around (ﬁgure 11). Home
price changes, with a 6-month lead, have signiﬁcant explanatory power for
single-family starts from mid-1976 to 2009: the adjusted R
2 is 0.36, and the
t-statistic is 15.0. American home builders, in my experience, respond to
home price changes, not the federal funds rate, to determine how many
“homes for sale” they start. And the home price change, as I noted earlier,
is a function of lagged long-term mortgage rates.
Housing starts, in any event, should be extraneous to Taylor’s explana-
tion of the bubble. It is employed because the Taylor rule by itself is struc-
tured to indicate a proper federal funds rate to balance the trade-off
between inflation and unemployment. There are no asset price inputs,
especially home prices, called for in the Taylor rule. Home prices cannot
be substituted willy-nilly for the consumer price index (CPI) or the core
personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index in the Taylor para-
digm. The CPI could stand as a proxy for home prices if the correlation
between the two were very high. But it is not. The correlation between
home prices and consumer prices, and between asset prices in general and
product prices, is small to negligible, and on occasion negative. The Taylor
rule clearly cannot be applied to asset prices, especially when benign prod-
uct price inﬂation is almost surely a necessary condition for an income-
producing-asset price bubble.
51
The correct interpretation of a Taylor rule as applied to the period
2002–05 that stipulates that the federal funds rate is too low is that product
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50. The Taylor rule indicated, according to a chart in Taylor (2007), that the funds rate
should have been set at an average of 3.7 percent during 2002–05, compared with an actual
average rate of 1.8 percent. Taylor’s calculations employ the consumer price index as the
inﬂation variable. Employing the core personal consumption expenditures price index, the
Federal Reserve’s preferred measure, narrows the gap signiﬁcantly.
51. Moreover, the usual culprits behind either asset or product price inﬂation were miss-
ing. Growth in the M2 measure of the money stock, for example, was well behaved during
2002–05.
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case) is threatening, and rate hikes to meet it are indicated. But inﬂation
did not threaten. Indeed, core PCE averaged a modest annual inﬂation rate
of only 1.9 percent during that period. Thus not only was the Taylor rule
inappropriate for assessing the causes of asset price increases; it also
gave a false signal for policy to stabilize the core PCE price.
The believers in Federal Reserve “easy money” policy as the root of the
housing bubble correctly note that a low federal funds rate (at only 1 per-
cent between mid-2003 and mid-2004) lowered interest rates for ARMs.
That, in turn, they claim, increased demand for homes ﬁnanced by ARMs
and hence was an important contributor to the emergence of the bubble.
But in retrospect, it appears that the decision to buy a home most likely
preceded the decision of how to ﬁnance the purchase. I suspect (but cannot
definitively prove) that during that period of euphoria, a large majority
of homebuyers who ended up financing with ARMs would have instead
funded their purchases with ﬁxed-rate mortgages had ARMs not been
available. How else can one explain the peaking of originations of ARMs
2 years before the peak in home prices (ﬁgure 12)? Market demand obvi-
ously did not need ARM ﬁnancing to elevate home prices during the last 
2 years of the expanding bubble.
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Source: Standard & Poor’s, LoanPerformance, and Bureau of the Census.
a. Three-month moving average of seasonally adjusted monthly data. Before December 1999, LoanPerfor-
mance Single-Family Combined Home Price Index; from December 1999 onward, S&P/Case-Shiller Composite 
20-City Index.
b. Starts of single-family homes, seasonally adjusted monthly data.
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Figure 11. Home Prices and Housing Starts, 1976–2009
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global, alludes to a seemingly tight relationship in a number of European
countries between the degree of deviation from the Taylor rule and the size
of the bubble. But a recent study by Federal Reserve staff (Dokko and
others 2009), using a broader sample of countries, notes that deviations
from the Taylor rule do not seem to be correlated with changes in home
prices. They conclude (p. 31) that the relationship is “statistically insignif-
icant (and relatively weak in economic terms as well).”
Moreover, Taylor does not buy the global saving-investment explana-
tion of the decline in real long-term interest rates (which he foreshortens
into the “saving glut”) as the trigger of the global housing bubble. He suc-
cinctly states,
Some argue that the low interest rates in 2002–4 were caused by global factors beyond the
control of the monetary authorities. If so, then the interest-rate decisions by the monetary
authorities were not the major factor causing the boom. This explanation—appealing at
ﬁrst glance because long-term interest rates remained low for a while after the short-term
federal funds rate began increasing—focuses on global saving. It argues that there was an
excess of world saving—a global saving glut—that pushed interest rates down in the
United States and other countries. The main problem with this explanation is that there is
no actual evidence of a global saving glut. On the contrary . . . the global saving rate—
world saving as a fraction of world GDP—was low in the 2002–4 period, especially when
compared with the 1970s and 1980s. (Taylor 2009, p. 6)
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Source: Mortgage Bankers Association and Standard & Poor’s.
a. Both series are quarterly data, seasonally adjusted.
Billions of dollars Index, Jan. 2000 = 100
S&P/Case-Shiller Composite 20-City
Home Price Index (right scale)
Originations (left scale)
50
100
150
200
250
2009 2008 2007 2006 2005 2004 2003 2002 2001 2000
50
100
150
200
Figure 12. Home Prices and Originations of Adjustable-Rate Mortgages, 2000–09a
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saving and investment intentions (see section II.A above), an argument
most economists should ﬁnd puzzling.
V.B. Could the Breakdown Have Been Prevented?
Could the breakdown that so devastated global ﬁnancial markets have
been prevented? Given inappropriately low ﬁnancial intermediary capital
(that is, excessive leverage) and two previous decades of virtually unre-
lenting prosperity, low inﬂation, and low long-term interest rates, I very
much doubt it. Those economic conditions are the necessary, and likely the
sufﬁcient, conditions for the emergence of a bubble in income-producing
assets. To be sure, central bank monetary tightening has the capacity to
break the back of any prospective cash ﬂow that supports bubbly asset
prices, but almost surely at the cost of a severe contraction of economic
output, with indeterminate consequences. The downside of that trade-off is
open-ended.
52
But why not tighten incrementally? There are no examples, to my
knowledge, of a successful incremental defusing of a bubble that left pros-
perity intact. Successful incremental tightening by central banks to gradu-
ally defuse a bubble requires a short-term feedback response.
53 But policy
affects an economy with long and variable lags of as much as 1 to 2 years.
54
How does the FOMC, for example, know in real time if its incremental
tightening is affecting the economy at a pace the policy requires? How
much in advance will it have to tighten to defuse the bubble without dis-
abling the economy? But more relevant, unless incremental tightening sig-
niﬁcantly raises risk aversion (and long-term interest rates) or disables the
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52. Tight regulations on mortgage lending—for example, down payment requirements
of 30 percent or more, the removal of the mortgage interest tax deduction, or elimination of
home mortgage nonrecourse provisions—would surely severely dampen enthusiasm for
homeownership. But they would also limit homeownership to the afﬂuent, unless ownership
by low- and moderate-income households were fully subsidized by government. Since Jan-
uary 2008 the subprime mortgage origination market has virtually disappeared. How will
HUD’s affordable housing goals (see note 10) be achieved in the future?
53. Some econometric models imply such capability for asset prices in general and
home prices in particular. They achieve this by assuming a stable term structure, which, of
necessity, yields a tight relationship between the federal funds rate and long-term rates. The
latter is then employed to capitalize a ﬂow of income (imputed housing services in the case
of homes).
54. See, for example, Alan S. Blinder, “The Case for Optimism on the Economy,” Wall
Street Journal, December 16, 2009.
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prices, I see little prospect of success.
The Federal Reserve’s one attempt at incremental tightening failed. In
early 1994 we embarked on a 300-basis-point tightening to confront what
we perceived at the time as growing inﬂationary pressures. It was a policy
that could have been just as easily read by the market as an incremental
tightening to defuse the then-incipient dot-com bubble.
We not only failed to defuse the nascent stock market bubble that was
evident in late 1993, but arguably enhanced it. The ability of the economy
to withstand a severe monetary tightening in 1994 inadvertently demon-
strated that the emerging boom was stronger than markets had anticipated
and, as a consequence, raised the equilibrium level of the Dow Jones
Industrial Average.
55 This suggested that a tightening far greater than the
1994 episode or the tightening in 2000 would have been required to quash
the bubble. Certainly a funds rate far higher than the 6
1⁄2 percent that was
reached in mid-2000 would have been required.
At some rate, monetary policy can crush any bubble. If 6
1⁄2 percent is not
enough, try 20 percent, or 50 percent for that matter. But the state of pros-
perity will be an inevitable victim.
56 In 2005 we at the Federal Reserve
did harbor concerns about the possible resolution of the housing bubble
euphoria that gripped the nation. In 2005 I noted, “History has not dealt
kindly with the aftermath of protracted periods of low risk premiums”
(Greenspan 2005, p. 7).
However, we at the Federal Reserve never had a sufﬁciently strong
conviction about the risks that could lie ahead. As I noted earlier, we had
been lulled into a state of complacency by the only modestly negative
economic aftermaths of the stock market crash of 1987 and the dot-com
bust. Given that history, we believed that any decline in home prices
would be gradual. Destabilizing debt problems were not perceived to
arise under those conditions.
For guidance, we looked to the policy response to the unprecedented
one-day stock-bubble bust of October 19, 1987, and the 2000 bear market.
Contrary to prior experience, large injections of Federal Reserve liquidity
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55. For details see Greenspan (2004a).
56. Such actions would obviously provoke an extreme political response. Although the
decisions of the FOMC are not subject to legal reversal, the range of monetary policy
choices has been politically constrained to what constitutes conventional wisdom in acade-
mia. As recent evidence reafﬁrms, the Federal Reserve’s degree of policy independence is
ﬁxed by statute, and it can be altered or eliminated by statute.
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led to economic retrenchment.
Unless there is a societal choice to abandon dynamic markets and lever-
age for some form of central planning, I fear that preventing bubbles will
in the end turn out to be infeasible. Assuaging their aftermath seems the
best we can hope for. Policies, both private and public, should focus on
ameliorating the extent of deprivation and hardship caused by deﬂationary
crises. But if an effective way, other than substantial increases in capital, to
defuse leveraged bubbles without a major impact on economic growth
were discovered, it would be a major step forward in organizing our mar-
ket economies.
VI. In Summary
In this paper I have endeavored to trace the powerful economic forces that
emerged in the aftermath of the Cold War and led to a dramatic decline and
convergence of global real long-term interest rates. That in turn engen-
dered, ﬁrst, a dramatic global home price bubble heavily leveraged by debt,
and second, a delinking of monetary policy from long-term interest rates.
57
The global bubble was exacerbated by the widespread packaging of
U.S. subprime and alt-A mortgages into securities, which found willing
buyers at home (especially the GSEs) and abroad, many encouraged by
grossly inflated credit ratings. More than a decade of virtually unrivaled
global prosperity, low inflation, and low long-term interest rates reduced
global risk aversion to historically unsustainable levels.
The bubble started to unravel in the summer of 2007. But unlike in the
“debt-lite” deﬂation that followed the earlier dot-com boom, heavy lever-
aging set off serial defaults, culminating in what is likely to be viewed as
the most virulent ﬁnancial crisis ever. The major failure of both private
risk management (including credit rating agencies) and ofﬁcial regulation
was to signiﬁcantly misjudge the size of the tail risks that were later
exposed in the aftermath of the Lehman default. Had capital and liquidity
provisions to absorb losses been signiﬁcantly higher going into the crisis,
contagious defaults surely would have been far less.
This paper has argued accordingly that the primary imperative going
forward has to be increased regulatory capital, liquidity, and collateral
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57. Whether the latter will continue with a less arbitrageable international bond market
remains to be seen.
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less important reform initiatives that may be useful.
But the notion of an effective “systemic regulator” as part of a regula-
tory reform package is ill advised. The chronic sad state of economic fore-
casting should give governments pause on that issue. Standard models,
except when heavily adjusted by ad hoc judgments, could not anticipate
the current crisis, let alone its depth. Indeed, models rarely anticipate
recessions, unless, again, the recession is artiﬁcially forced into the model
structure.
In closing, let me reiterate that the fundamental lesson of this crisis is
that, given the complexity of the division of labor required of modern
global economies, we need highly innovative ﬁnancial systems to ensure
the proper functioning of those economies. But although, fortunately, most
ﬁnancial innovation is successful, much is not. And it is not possible in
advance to discern the future success of each innovation. Only adequate
capital and collateral can resolve this dilemma. If capital is adequate, then,
by deﬁnition, no ﬁnancial institution will default and serial contagion will
be thwarted. Determining the proper level of risk-adjusted capital should
be the central focus of reform going forward.
We can legislate prohibitions on the kinds of securitized assets that
aggravated the current crisis. But markets for newly originated alt-A and
adjustable-rate subprime mortgages, synthetic collateralized debt obliga-
tions, and many previously highly popular structured investment vehicles
no longer exist. And private investors have shown no inclination to revive
them. The next crisis will no doubt exhibit a plethora of innovative new
assets, some of which will have unintended toxic characteristics that no
one can forecast in advance. But if capital and collateral are adequate,
losses will be restricted to those equity shareholders who seek abnormal
returns but in the process expose themselves to abnormal losses. Taxpay-
ers should not be at risk.
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Comments and Discussion
COMMENT BY
N. GREGORY MANKIW This is a great paper. It presents one of the
best comprehensive narratives about what went wrong over the past several
years that I have read. If you want to assign your students only one paper to
read about the recent ﬁnancial crisis, this would be a good choice. There
are some pieces of the analysis about which I am skeptical. But before I get
to that, let me emphasize several important points of agreement.
Greenspan refers to recent events in the housing market as a “classic
euphoric bubble.” He is certainly right that asset markets can depart from
apparent fundamentals in ways that are often hard to understand. This has
happened before, and it will happen again. When the bubble bursts, the
aftershocks are never pleasant.
Greenspan then points out that the political process, rather than reducing
the risks associated with the bubble, actually contributed to them. In a foot-
note, he points out that in October 2000, in the waning days of the Clinton
administration, the Department of Housing and Urban Development ﬁnal-
ized rules that expanded the affordable housing goals of the government-
sponsored enterprises (GSEs) Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. As a result,
the GSEs increased their holdings of subprime mortgages substantially.
Although neither Greenspan nor I would suggest that the crisis was pri-
marily the result of misguided housing policies, we both believe that these
policies served to make a bad situation worse. This fact is important to
keep in mind—not to assess blame; there is more than enough of that to
go around. Rather, in judging how much policy can accomplish going
forward, one should be mindful of how imperfect the political process is.
When considering what future regulation can do to reduce the likelihood
of future crises, Greenspan emphasizes that whatever rules are promulgated
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future. In my view this is particularly wise. Some think the main cause
of the recent crisis is that policymakers failed to anticipate the bursting of
the housing bubble. If only we had central bankers with greater prescience,
the argument goes, all this could have been avoided. In my view—and,
I believe, Greenspan’s as well—this is wishful thinking in the extreme. It
indeed would be nice if somehow the individuals guiding the national econ-
omy had superhuman powers to see into the future. In reality, our economic
leaders are mortals who share the same biases and ﬂaws in perception as
market participants.
What, then, can be done to make the ﬁnancial system more crash-proof?
Greenspan offers several good suggestions. First and most obvious, capital
requirements should be raised. This is truer now than it has ever been. By
bailing out almost every major ﬁnancial institution that needed it, as well
as a few that did not, the federal government raised the expectation of
future bailouts, thereby turning the entire ﬁnancial system, in effect, into a
group of GSEs. Going forward, creditors to these institutions will view
them as safe, and so they will lend to them too freely. The institutions, in
turn, will be tempted to respond to their low cost of debt by leveraging to
excess. Higher capital requirements are needed to counteract this newly
expanded moral hazard.
Second, I like Greenspan’s idea of “living wills,” in which ﬁnancial
intermediaries are required to offer their own plans to wind themselves
down in the event they fail. The advantage of this idea is that when future
failures occur, as they surely will, policymakers will have a game plan in
hand. How well these ﬁnancial living wills will work, however, is hard to
say. Like real wills, they may well be contested by “next of kin”—the
counterparties to the institution’s transactions. For living wills to work,
they would need to be made public—say, by putting them on a centralized
webpage—to discourage the counterparties from complaining after the
fact that they thought they had more legal rights in the event of liquidation
than they do.
Third, and perhaps most important, I like the idea of requiring ﬁnancial
ﬁrms to issue contingent debt that will turn into equity when some regula-
tor deems that the ﬁrm has insufﬁcient capital. Essentially, this debt would
become a form of preplanned recapitalization in the event of a future ﬁnan-
cial crisis. But most important, the recapitalization would be done with pri-
vate rather than public money. Because the ﬁnancial ﬁrm would pay the
cost of these contingent funds, rather than enjoying taxpayer subsidies, it
would have an incentive today to lower its risk proﬁle, for instance by
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contingency would be triggered, and the lower the interest rate the ﬁrm
would pay on this contingent debt.
This brings me to the one conclusion of the paper with which I disagree—
or, at least, I was not sufﬁciently persuaded. The issue concerns the impor-
tance of leverage to the viability of a ﬁnancial intermediary. Greenspan
proposes raising capital requirements and reducing leverage, but he sug-
gests that there are limits to this. If leverage is reduced too much, he argues,
ﬁnancial intermediaries will be not be sufﬁciently proﬁtable to remain
viable. He offers some back-of-the-envelope calculations that purport to
show how much leverage the ﬁnancial system needs to stay aﬂoat.
When I read this part of the paper, my first thought was, What about
the Modigliani-Miller theorem? Recall that this famous theorem says
that a firm’s value as a business enterprise is independent of how it is
financed. The debt-equity ratio determines how the risky cash flow from
operations is divided among creditors and owners, but it does not affect
whether the firm is fundamentally viable as a going concern. It seems to
me that, as least as a first approximation, the logic of this theorem should
apply to financial intermediaries as well as to other types of business. If
not, why not?
I think it is clear where, from the Modigliani-Miller perspective,
Greenspan’s calculations go awry. He assumes that the rate of return on
equity must be at least 5 percent. But as he notes, this number is actually
endogenous to the degree of leverage. If a bank is less leveraged, its equity
will be safer, and the required rate of return should fall.
Indeed, one can imagine a bank with almost no leverage at all. Suppose
banks were required to hold 100 percent reserves against demand deposits,
and that all bank loans had to be ﬁnanced 100 percent with bank capital. A
bank would then, in essence, be a marriage of a super-safe money market
mutual fund with an unleveraged ﬁnance company. (Such a system would
be similar to what is sometimes called “narrow banking.”) It seems to me
that a banking system operating under such strict regulations could well
perform the crucial economic function of ﬁnancial intermediation. No
leverage would be required.
Such a system would, however, forgo the “maturity transformation”
function of the current ﬁnancial system, in which many banks and other
intermediaries borrow short and lend long. The issue I am wrestling with is
whether maturity transformation is a crucial feature of a successful ﬁnan-
cial system. The resulting maturity mismatch seems to be a central element
of banking panics and ﬁnancial crises. The open question is what value it
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exceed the all-too-obvious costs.
To put the point most broadly: The Modigliani-Miller theorem says
leverage and capital structure are irrelevant, yet many bankers would
surely claim they are central to the process of ﬁnancial intermediation. A
compelling question on the research agenda is to ﬁgure out who is right,
and why.
COMMENT BY
JEREMY C. STEIN It is a pleasure to comment on this important and
wide-ranging paper by Alan Greenspan. In light of the breadth of ground
that it covers, I will have to focus my comments on just a couple of the
issues that struck me as particularly interesting. The ﬁrst of these concerns
the central role of capital and liquidity requirements in any attempt to
reform ﬁnancial markets. As the paper states, “The most pressing reform,
in my judgment, in the aftermath of the crisis is to ﬁx the level of regula-
tory risk-adjusted capital, liquidity, and collateral standards required by
counterparties.” I agree with this view. Moreover, Chairman Greenspan
makes a highly welcome contribution by taking this observation to the log-
ical next step: he poses, and attempts to answer, the quantitative question
of just how high capital requirements should be raised. This is a point on
which most policymakers have thus far been conspicuously silent.
The paper argues for a regulatory minimum ratio of book equity to assets
in the neighborhood of 14 percent. The argument has two parts. First, a
rough calculation suggests that a 14 percent ratio would provide the bank-
ing sector with a buffer adequate to see it through a crisis equal in magni-
tude to that of the last few years. And second, another back-of-the-envelope
exercise yields the conclusion that a 14 percent regulatory minimum would
not be overly burdensome, in the speciﬁc sense that it would not prevent
banks from earning a return on equity in line with historical averages.
In the same spirit of simple calibration, I would like to offer another
approach to the second piece of the puzzle: the costs associated with raising
capital requirements by several percentage points. My analysis is nothing
more than an application of the standard weighted average cost of capital
(WACC) machinery that is routinely taught to MBA students everywhere,
which augments the Modigliani-Miller (1958) paradigm to take account of
corporate income taxes. Suppose that equity capital requirements are raised
very substantially—say, by 10 percentage points. Moreover, suppose that at
the margin, this additional equity displaces long-term debt in the capital
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net effect of this change on banks’ WACC (and hence on the rate they
charge for corporate or consumer loans, for example) comes from the lost
tax deductions on the long-term debt that is eliminated. Thus, if the dis-
placed debt yielded, say, 7 percent, then given a 35 percent corporate tax
rate, a 10-percentage-point reduction in the debt tax shield would raise the
WACC by 0.10 × 0.07 × 0.35 = 0.00245, or about 25 basis points. Again,
this is the impact of a very large increase in the equity capital ratio, equiv-
alent to going from a low initial ratio of 4 percent all the way up to the
level suggested by Greenspan of 14 percent.
Of course, this calculation comes with a number of caveats. First, and
perhaps most important, it should be thought of as capturing the long-run
steady-state costs of having to hold more equity on the balance sheet,
while disregarding the transitional ﬂow costs associated with raising the
required new equity. Given the adverse selection problems associated with
new equity issues (Myers and Majluf 1984), these flow costs may be sig-
nificant. This implies that if higher capital requirements are phased in
too abruptly—so that banks have to get there through large external
equity issues, rather than by gradually accumulating retained earnings—
the transitional impact on their lending behavior may be much higher
than my 25-basis-point ﬁgure suggests.
Another caveat is that even in a long-run steady state, taxes may not be
the only relevant violation of the idealized Modigliani-Miller conditions.
To take one example, Gary Gorton and Andrew Metrick (2010) and Stein
(2010) argue that banks like to issue collateralized short-term debt because
this debt commands a “money-like” convenience premium based on its
relative safety and the transactions services that safe claims provide. If one
takes a crude upper bound on this convenience premium to be 1 percent,
and if capital requirements have the effect of crowding out such short-term
debt at the margin, as opposed to long-term debt, this would add another
0.10 × 0.01 = 10 basis points to the overall effect,
1 for a total of 35 instead
of 25. This logic suggests that other sensible modiﬁcations are also likely
to have only a relatively small effect.
All of this would therefore seem to reinforce—albeit with a quite differ-
ent methodology—the broad conclusions in Greenspan’s paper, namely, that
although there are undoubtedly costs associated with signiﬁcant increases
in bank capital requirements, a crude estimate of these costs does not
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mine would appear to give signiﬁcant comfort to those who worry that
plausibly higher capital requirements will make bank loans much more
expensive.
And yet there would seem to be an obvious tension here. Banks mani-
festly care a great deal about optimizing their capital structures, and they
show a persistent tendency to gravitate toward high leverage. In contrast,
most nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, many of which operate with dramatically lower
leverage, seldom appear to be nearly as strongly drawn toward any ﬁxed
target capital structure. So although the Modigliani-Miller-plus-taxes para-
digm may be adequate for capturing the relatively small beneﬁts of debt
for nonﬁnancial ﬁrms, one wonders, in light of their very different behav-
ior, whether the same paradigm does not leave out something of ﬁrst-order
importance when it comes to ﬁnancial ﬁrms. Put simply: if higher capital
ratios have only a small impact on the WACC for ﬁnancial ﬁrms, why do
they—unlike their nonﬁnancial counterparts—resist them so forcefully?
My own attempt at reconciling this tension goes as follows. Perhaps the
substitution of equity for debt ﬁnance does in fact have the same small
effects on the WACC for ﬁnancial and nonﬁnancial ﬁrms—say, 25 basis
points for a 10-percentage-point change in the equity ratio. But what is
different about ﬁnancial ﬁrms are the competitive implications of a small
cost-of-capital disadvantage. An auto manufacturer or a software ﬁrm is
unlikely to be driven out of business over a 25-basis-point cost-of-capital
difference; so many other factors—the quality of its product, the loyalty of
its customer base, and so on—are so much more important that it can fail
to fully optimize on the cost-of-capital dimension and still survive. In con-
trast, for a ﬁnancial ﬁrm, cheap capital is the single dominant input, and it
simply cannot afford to cede a 25-basis-point edge to its competitors. In
this sense, high leverage is for ﬁnancial ﬁrms like what a performance-
enhancing drug is for elite sprinters: even if the drug is harmful to health
and cuts only a few hundredths of a second from their times, with all else
so closely matched, they may not feel they can afford not to take it.
On the one hand, the drug analogy makes much stricter capital regulation
seem like a no-brainer: if it can stop a systemically unhealthy form of com-
petition with only a minimal impact on performance (in this case, on the
cost of loans to corporations and households), then it would seem highly
desirable from a social perspective. The hitch, however, is that, much like
with drug testing, the same competitive forces create a powerful motive for
evading the regulation. One important channel for this evasion is migration
of credit creation from the regulated banking sector to the less regulated
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its balance sheet, subject to the more stringent capital rules, a bank can bun-
dle the loan with other, similar loans into a security, which winds up, say,
in the portfolio of a hedge fund, which in turn ﬁnances its purchase of the
security largely with overnight repos and only a very thin slice of capital.
Although such migration may leave the banks themselves safer, it is
much less clear that it leaves the ﬁnancial system in better shape should a
crisis occur. One of the most dramatic features of the subprime crisis was
the complete collapse of the market for asset-backed securities—and not
just those related to subprime mortgages, but also those based on auto
loans, credit card receivables, student loans, and other assets. This market
collapse, which was arrested only by the Federal Reserve’s intervention
with the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility (TALF), played an
important role in deepening the credit crunch.
The bottom line is that I do not worry too much about the effects of
higher capital requirements on the cost of loans to households and ﬁrms.
Based on the sorts of calculations sketched above, my best estimate is that
these effects will be relatively muted. At the same time, I worry a great
deal about the effects on how and by whom credit is provided, and the
potential implications of these changes for overall systemic stability.
To be clear, I do not at all mean to suggest that capital requirements for
banks should not be signiﬁcantly higher. Indeed, if forced to pick a number
for the required capital ratio, I might well come out somewhere in the same
range as Greenspan. However, the danger of competition leading to evasion
of the capital requirement suggests that the focus should not be just on
banks, or even just on all bank-like institutions. Rather, an effort must be
made to impose similar capital standards across a given asset class, no mat-
ter who winds up holding the asset. This will not be an easy task, but one
tool that might be helpful is broad-based regulation of “haircuts” (that is,
minimum margin requirements) on asset-backed securities that trade in the
shadow banking market. Returning to the previous example, this regula-
tion might stipulate that whoever holds a tranche of a consumer loan secu-
ritization, be it a hedge fund, a pension fund, or anybody else, would be
required to post a minimum haircut against that tranche. The value of the
haircut would depend on the seniority of the tranche, the underlying collat-
eral, and so forth. If these haircut requirements are well structured, they
could go a long way toward achieving harmonization across organizational
forms, in that there would be no obvious advantage based on avoidance of
regulation to moving the consumer loans off the balance sheets of banks
and into the shadow banking sector.
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thetic to this approach, and indeed that he has something very much along
these lines in mind when he refers to the need to “ﬁx the level of...  c o l -
lateral standards required by counterparties.” If so, I hope that other poli-
cymakers will pay careful attention to his advice.
On a different note, I am inclined to be more skeptical of Greenspan’s
analysis when he downplays the role of low short-term interest rates in the
initial years of the housing boom. He writes, “The global home price bub-
ble . . . was a consequence of lower interest rates, but it was long-term
interest rates that galvanized home asset prices, not the overnight rates of
central banks, as has become the seeming conventional wisdom” (empha-
sis in original). My own suspicion is that short-term rates did play an impor-
tant independent role, by reducing the required monthly payments for
borrowers taking out adjustable-rate mortgages (ARMs), whose rates are
tied to short-term market rates. This hypothesis presumes that some of
these borrowers were either myopic or liquidity constrained, so that their
initial monthly payment—as opposed to the expected payments over the
life of the loan—was decisive in their choice. Although this presumption
may not accurately characterize the behavior of the majority of borrow-
ers in normal real estate markets, perhaps it rings more true as a descrip-
tion of the recent subprime boom.
In any case, although I do not have conclusive evidence for my hypoth-
esis, I can offer one suggestive set of plots. Figure 1 plots, for each year
from 2001 through 2006, the share of fixed-rate mortgages in total mort-
gages initiated in each of 269 metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs)
against an affordability index for that MSA. The affordability index is
from Moody’s Economy.com and is based on the median family income in
an MSA relative to the monthly mortgage payment on a median-priced
home in that MSA (assuming a conventional ﬁxed-rate mortgage loan).
Higher values of the index correspond to greater affordability, that is, to
higher ratios of incomes to home prices.
The ﬁgure conveys two key messages. First, throughout the period,
ARM use is more prevalent in more expensive cities, where liquidity con-
straints are presumably more likely to be binding on homebuyers. Second,
this relationship becomes strikingly more pronounced between 2002 and
2004, when the federal funds rate was bottoming out and home prices
began to rise dramatically. This latter effect is consistent with the key
mechanism underlying my hypothesis, namely, that the short-term rate
works through its ability to reduce the monthly payments for income-
constrained borrowers who ﬁnance their homes with ARMs.
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Figure 1. Share of Fixed-Rate Mortgages and Housing Affordability in 269 MSAs,
2001–06
Source: Benjamin Iverson, Harvard Business School, and James Vickery, Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
using data from Moody’s Economy.com and the Monthly Interest Rate Survey from the Federal Housing
Finance Agency.
a. Each observation is for a single MSA. The affordability index is based on the ratio of median family income
in an MSA to the monthly payment on a conventional fixed-rate mortgage for a median-priced home in that
MSA. Higher values of the index indicate greater affordability (that is, a higher ratio of median income to
mortgage payment). Lines are fitted regression lines.
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to support the story I have in mind with any real degree of conﬁdence.
Nevertheless, at a minimum, I believe that the role of short-term rates in the
recent housing bubble remains an important open question.
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GENERAL DISCUSSION Several panelists expressed thanks to Chair-
man Greenspan for his service to the nation and for his candor in stating that
the events of the last few years had led him to revise some long-held views.
Gregory Mankiw agreed with Jeremy Stein that in the presence of taxes
there is a preference for debt over equity, to which banks may well respond
more than other ﬁrms. If that is the case, then the policy prescription is
clear: reform the tax code to eliminate the preference for debt.
Alan Blinder pointed to what seemed an incipient consensus on there
being two types of bubble, although this may oversimplify what might
really be a continuum. Bubbles of the ﬁrst type, which includes the tech
stock bubble of the late 1990s, are based on equity rather than leverage and
credit, whereas those of the second, which include the recent crisis, are
based on excessive leverage. The Greenspan-Bernanke mop-up-after
view of how to deal with crises continues to make sense for the first type
but not for the second. One reason is that the Federal Reserve has infor-
mational advantages in the credit system, especially the banking part. If
the Federal Reserve were designated an explicit systemic risk regulator
over the entire financial system, that informational advantage would
become even larger.
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structure of ﬁnancial institutions has to be part of the solution, but he was
unsure whether it is the whole solution. There is potentially an intermedi-
ate course of action between forced bankruptcy, as in the case of Lehman
Brothers, and bailout, as in the case of AIG. The government can step in
and grab hold of the reins, ﬁre management, wipe out the shareholders,
impose some losses on creditors, and then take the failed ﬁrm into either
receivership or conservatorship. Authority to undertake such resolutions
will be an important part of any reform—not because it will prevent bub-
bles, but because it will mitigate the fallout and the cost to taxpayers when
they happen. Related to this is the need to require more collateral behind
purchases of over-the-counter derivatives—the capital markets analogue to
increasing bank capital. One could go further and more or less force deriv-
atives transactions onto organized exchanges, by imposing a higher capital
requirement for derivatives not traded on exchanges. Reform should also
include doing something about the go-for-broke incentives that were ram-
pant in ﬁnancial markets in the run-up to the crisis.
Benjamin Friedman observed that strengthening capital requirements is
also about accounting reform. Often what matters is not just the speciﬁc
percentage by which assets must be backed by equity, but also the speciﬁ-
cation of the asset total by which that percentage gets multiplied. For exam-
ple, the chief problem at Citibank was the $100 billion in assets that were
off the balance sheet, and therefore against which the bank held zero capi-
tal. The comparable off-balance-sheet amount at Lehman Brothers was
$50 billion. In each case the needed reform is not choosing a new percent-
age but requiring that capital be held against a much more inclusive speci-
ﬁcation of the ﬁrm’s assets.
Friedman also thought the Modigliani-Miller perspective, which had
been suggested by both discussants, was interesting but led to a troubling
conclusion. The standard Modigliani-Miller theorem assumes not only no
taxes, but also no bankruptcy. If the banking system as a whole is operat-
ing at one level of leverage, then any one bank that is forced to make do
with less leverage is at a competitive disadvantage. If the banking system
requires some minimum amount of leverage to do business, this implies
some probability of any bank (or even all of them) failing, and this in turn
requires either a public sector subsidy or the possibility of a taxpayer
bailout. If that is so, it means there cannot be a banking sector unless the
banks collectively have a leverage ratio high enough to put the taxpayer
at risk.
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regulation by public institutions and regulation by creditors. Before the
crisis, Greenspan had argued forcefully and articulately that the latter was
superior. The paper, however, was as sharply critical of one as of the other.
Friedman therefore wondered whether the experience of the crisis had
changed Greenspan’s thinking on the relative advantages of the two.
Olivier Blanchard followed up on Mankiw’s remarks regarding matu-
rity transformation. In the aggregate, most savers probably have a longer
horizon than the ﬁrms to which they lend. Much of this saving is for retire-
ment or other long-term purposes, whereas much physical capital has a life
of about 10 years. Thus, at the macro level, the transformation of short-
term saving into long-term investment does not seem that important, yet
many institutions are involved in precisely that process.
Martin Baily laid out two views prevalent among noneconomists of
what caused the crisis: one is that it was all about greedy bankers, whose
actions produced a market failure of the worst kind. The other is that it was
a government failure, either of the regulators or of housing policy. For
those who think the culprit was federal policy, the answer is to change the
policy—to get the government out of the way and let the market work. For
those who think the problem was market failure, the answer is to strengthen
regulation. But in Baily’s view the crisis was caused by both market failure
and government failure, and therefore to some extent both things have to be
done—some mix of less government in some areas and more government
in others is needed.
Baily agreed that bubbles cannot be forecast precisely, but that does not
mean that nothing can or should be done when one sees a bubble forming.
If you know you have high cholesterol, you may not know whether or when
you will have a heart attack, but it is still a good idea to take anti-cholesterol
medication. When policymakers—both financial regulators and mone-
tary authorities—observe a highly leveraged increase in asset prices, they
should do something, even though they risk being wrong in their diagnosis.
It is worth taking out the insurance policy of at least leaning against that
particular wind. It would also be a good idea for the Federal Reserve to
have another tool that it presently lacks, namely, the ability to adjust mar-
gin requirements or capital requirements of all kinds—for example, to set
minimum down payments for mortgages in the event of an incipient mort-
gage bubble.
Baily agreed, to some degree, that a large moral hazard had been cre-
ated. There were good reasons to protect debtors in the heat of the crisis,
but doing so also created a danger: investors might believe that the regula-
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hazard problem can be overstated. The managers of ﬁnancial institutions
have certainly taken a hit: almost all the institutions that got into trouble
have replaced their managers. Shareholders have taken a big hit as well.
The problem is mainly on the debtors’ side, and it needs to be dealt with
through the living wills and other resolution mechanisms that Greenspan
mentioned, to make sure that the debtors cannot walk away unscathed.
Christopher Carroll called the Panel’s attention to the fact that Robert
Shiller, in a December 1996 speech at the Federal Reserve, had warned of
a bubble emerging in the stock market, and that in January 2004, speaking
again at the Federal Reserve, Shiller had warned of a bubble emerging in
the housing market. Perhaps when Robert Shiller enters the precincts of
the Federal Reserve Board, he takes on supernatural powers that give
him intuition on this subject that others lack. But if one or at least a few
respected economists have strong intuitions that a bubble is in the process
of forming, that does seem an appropriate time for regulators to think
about becoming more vigilant.
Christopher Sims cited the paper’s observation that the private sector
did not seem to price systemic risk very well leading up to the crisis. This
suggests the presence of an externality: just because private agents do not
take account of the risks they impose on the system does not mean that sys-
temic risk does not exist. That the markets did not seem to react to this risk
in advance raises the question of whether regulators could do better. There
is some chance that the right kind of regulators could do better, through
aggressive information collection or examination of accounting practices,
for example. Then the question becomes how to avoid regulatory capture.
In the years leading up to the crisis, it had become politically difﬁcult to
suggest tighter regulation. One argument for assigning more responsibility
for systemic regulation to the Federal Reserve rather than some other
agency is that the Federal Reserve has a dedicated revenue source and its
governors serve 14-year terms. These things go a long way toward making
regulators independent and allowing them to avoid capture.
George von Furstenberg interpreted the paper’s message to private
ﬁnancial institutions as “Go ahead and spill it—we will mop it up.” Yet
this policy, he argued, has already led to enormous underpricing of risk
and subsequent socialization of enormous losses. This was indeed the oppo-
site of central planning—it was central bungling. In other words, what pro-
duces a deviation from market models is to let markets be perceived as
failing in an egregious way. Therefore, it is important to take precautions
and buffer the system against the destructive effects of bubbles. If bubbles
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of these have absurdly kicked in after the fact: now the Federal Housing
Administration and the GSEs have increased their lending standards;
now firms like AIG are subject to special margin requirements. There are
many things that can be done to reduce the vulnerability of the system to
bubbles, if bubbles there must be. If you know that hailstorms exist but
cannot predict them, you do not have to stand outdoors bareheaded. There
are ways to reduce your exposure. Certainly the only course is not just
to mop up afterward—a strategy that in this case has been anything but
market directed, and has been very incomplete and extremely costly to
the taxpayer.
Richard Cooper agreed with Greenspan that banks, at a minimum,
should be subject to higher capital requirements, and perhaps other ﬁnan-
cial institutions should as well. He wondered why that general point is not
even more broadly applicable—why not, for example, impose minimum
down payment requirements on homebuyers? The Federal Reserve had
full authority to require the institutions it regulated to impose such require-
ments; in the spirit of Baily’s anti-cholesterol metaphor, imposing such
requirements in 2003 and 2004 might have prevented the heart attack,
given what was known at the time.
Cooper also agreed with Friedman on the need for accounting reform,
and speciﬁcally for bringing structured investment vehicles and the like
onto banks’ consolidated balance sheets. He was at least as interested,
however, in the principles governing the valuation of assets and liabilities,
particularly when regular markets do not exist (for venture capital, for
example) or when they have frozen, as happened in late 2008. In this coun-
try, accounting rules are left to an entirely private body called the National
Accounting Standards Board, which operates under the principle that all
information that can conceivably be brought onto the ﬁnancial statements
should be. Transparency and bringing things onto the balance sheet are
two different things, however. Cooper wondered whether the process for
setting accounting standards in general ought to be reviewed, or whether a
set of regulatory accounting standards ought to be established that would
be used for setting capital requirements, rather than relying on mark-to-
market rules, particularly when the market valuations have to be artiﬁcially
simulated or taken from a few distress transactions.
Robert Hall noted that Martin Baily had prescribed anti-bubble med-
ication as if a best-selling medication of that type already existed. But the
paper’s argument was that the interest rate controlled by the central bank
is not an effective anti-bubble medication, at least with respect to real
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real estate look far into the future, yet the central bank’s inﬂuence is lim-
ited to a relatively short horizon. Hall pointed out that many countries that
did not have ARMs—and the great majority do not—also had huge hous-
ing bubbles. The evidence points to low long-term interest rates as what
matter when valuing housing, and therefore suggests that it was low
global long-term rates, not short-term rates, that caused what became a
worldwide bubble.
Hall went on to note that the other anti-bubble medication, suggested by
Richard Cooper, involves introducing frictions into ﬁnancial markets by
regulating down payments or margins. There is nothing intrinsically wrong
or dangerous about making risky loans, provided that the institutions hold-
ing the loans are not huge, highly leveraged, and systemically important.
Getting a much more robust ﬁnancial system is the solution to this prob-
lem, not anti-bubble medication. The economy rode through the equity
bubble that popped in 2000 without any ﬁnancial crisis. It should be able to
ride through a real estate bubble just as well.
Justin Wolfers noted that the paper was largely silent on the shadow
banking system and hoped for more discussion of that topic in the ﬁnal
draft.
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